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USING INSURANCE TO REGULATE FOOD
SAFETY: FIELD NOTES FROM THE FRESH
PRODUCE SECTOR
Timothy D. Lytton*

ABSTRACT
Foodborne illness is a public health problem of pandemic
proportions. In the United States alone, contaminated food sickens
an estimated 48 million consumers annually, causing 128,000
hospitalizations and 3,000 deaths. Nowhere is this crisis more
acute than in the fresh produce sector, where microbial
contamination in growing fields and packing houses has been
responsible for many of the nation’s largest and deadliest
outbreaks. This Article examines emerging efforts by private
insurance companies to regulate food safety on farms that grow
fresh produce.
Previous studies of using insurance to regulate food safety rely on
economic theories that yield competing conclusions. Optimists
argue that insurance can promote efficient risk reduction. Skeptics
counter that insufficient information regarding the root causes of
contamination renders insurance impotent to reduce food safety
risk. This Article adds a sociolegal perspective to this debate.
Based on interviews with insurance professionals, the Article
documents how, notwithstanding limited information,
underwriters employ a variety of techniques to encourage
compliance with government food safety regulations and
conformity to industry standards. These techniques include
premium discounts for clients who adopt state-of-the-art food
safety practices, coverage exclusions for high-risk activities, and
loss control advice about how to avoid contamination.
Insurance plays a growing and potentially transformative role in
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advancing food safety. Government food safety regulation has
traditionally been hampered by inadequate inspection resources.
This Article advocates expanding insurance to fill oversight gaps
in the U.S. food safety system, and it offers specific
recommendations for how to nurture emerging markets for food
safety coverage.
The findings presented in this Article have implications for
understanding how insurance regulates risk more generally.
Economic analysis of many well-established types of insurance—
for example, life, health, homeowners, and auto—emphasizes the
role of actuarial data in pricing premiums, determining coverage
limits, and informing loss control advice. However, the
underwriting professionals in this Article who describe their
efforts to improve food safety on farms tell a different story. They
operate in an emerging market with a low volume of claims and a
dearth of actuarial data. Three aspects of their work stand out.
First, underwriting in this area is more impressionistic than
economic analysis assumes. When assessing the risk of microbial
contamination on farms, underwriters rely more on their intuitions
about a farmer’s competence and on media coverage of highprofile foodborne illness outbreaks than on actuarial data.
Second, the mindset of these underwriters is more administrative
than economic. They think in terms of regulatory compliance and
standards conformity rather than optimal risk reduction. Third,
farm size determines the role of insurance in managing risk. Highpremium coverage for larger farms provides more underwriting
resources for risk management than low-premium policies priced
for small farms. These findings suggest that although economics
explains the logic of insurance as form of risk regulation,
understanding how underwriters regulate risk in practice,
especially in emerging markets, requires attention to professional
judgment, bureaucratic thinking, and resource constraints.
INTRODUCTION
California’s Salinas Valley is blessed with rich soil and moderate
temperatures that make it an ideal place for cultivating fresh produce. Famous for
abundant fields of lettuce, spinach, and tomatoes, the region has long been known as
“America’s salad bowl.”1 However, in recent years, it has also become notorious as
the source of recurrent foodborne illness outbreaks traced to leafy greens
contaminated with virulent bacterial pathogens such as E. coli O157, Salmonella,
and Listeria monocytogenes.2
1. See generally BURTON ANDERSON, AMERICA’S SALAD BOWL: AN AGRICULTURAL HISTORY OF
THE SALINAS VALLEY (2000).

2. Kate Gibson, A Dozen Sickened in Another E. coli Outbreak Linked to Romaine Lettuce, CBS
NEWS (Nov. 12, 2020), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/romaine-lettuce-recall-e-coli-outbreak/
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These troubles in the Salinas Valley, and in fresh produce fields and
packinghouses across the United States more generally, offer a window on the
challenges of preventing microbial contamination of food and the widespread illness
that it causes. Foodborne illness is a nationwide public health problem of pandemic
proportions. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that
contaminated food causes 48 million cases of acute gastroenteritis each year,
resulting in 128,000 hospitalizations, 3,000 deaths, and $1.8 billion in healthcare
costs.3 More than twice as many Americans are sickened every year by foodborne
pathogens than contracted coronavirus in 2020.4 More than double the number of
Americans fall victim to foodborne illness annually than suffer injuries from traffic
accidents, falls, cuts, natural disasters, cycling, poisoning, and burns combined.5
Fresh produce plays a prominent role in this food safety pandemic. According to a
2015 report by the Center for Science and the Public Interest, “[p]roduce caused
more illnesses than any other food category and had the largest number of outbreaks
for any single food category.”6

[https://perma.cc/UW99-49Y4]; Kevin Loria, Leafy Greens Safety Guide: In an Age of Rampant Romaine
Contamination, Can Our Salads be Saved?, CONSUMER REPS. (Jan. 27, 2020),
https://www.consumerreports.org/food-safety/leafy-greens-safety-guide
[https://perma.cc/V425GGGB]; Teresa Carr, In Food Regulations, a Surprising Paucity of Research, UNDARK (Feb. 5, 2020),
https://undark.org/2020/02/05/lack-research-food-safety-regulations/ [https://perma.cc/TW5W-LHDL]
(relating that in 2018 and 2019 alone, the CDC reported 474 illnesses, 219 hospitalizations, and six deaths
from multistate outbreaks linked to leafy greens); FOODBORNE ILLNESS OUTBREAK DATABASE
http://outbreakdatabase.com/search/?outbreak=lettuce+spinach [https://perma.cc/7C6D-C9BH] (search
results for “lettuce” and “spinach”); Katherine E. Marshall, April Hexemer, Sharon L. Seelman, Marianne
K. Fatica, Tyann Blessington, Maha Hajmeer, Hannah Kisselburgh, Robin Atkinson, Kristin Hill,
Davendra Sharma, Michael Needham, Vi Peralta, Jeffrey Higa, Karen Blickenstaff, Ian T. Williams,
Michael A. Jhung, Matthew Wise, & Laura Gieraltowski, Lessons Learned from a Decade of
Investigations of Shiga Toxin-Producing Escherichia coli Outbreaks Linked to Leafy Greens, United
States and Canada, 26 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 2319 (2020).
3. Estimates of Foodborne Illness in the United States, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/foodborneburden/2011-foodborne-estimates.html
[https://perma.cc/8BX8-VQ7B]; SANDRA HOFFMANN, BRYAN MACULLOCH & MICHAEL BATZ, ECON.
RSCH. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECONOMIC INFORMATION BULLETIN NO. 140, ECONOMIC BURDEN
OF MAJOR FOODBORNE ILLNESSES ACQUIRED IN THE UNITED STATES
11 (2015),
https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/43984/52807_eib140.pdf
[https://perma.cc/77TZE3NM] (includes cost of medical care for fifteen leading foodborne illnesses, which constitute
approximately 95 percent of the total). For analysis of these estimates, see TIMOTHY D. LYTTON,
OUTBREAK: FOODBORNE ILLNESS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR FOOD SAFETY 3–8, 243–45 (2019).
4. CDC COVID Data Tracker, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, archived at
https://perma.cc/2KNM-93A7 (reporting 19,663,976 total COVID-19 cases in the United States between
January 21, 2020 and December 31, 2020).
5. LYTTON, supra note 3, at 6.
6. NILS FISCHER, ARIEL BOURNE & DAVID PLUNKETT, CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. INT., OUTBREAK
ALERT! 2015: A REVIEW OF FOODBORNE ILLNESS IN THE U.S. FROM 2004–2013 (2015),
https://cspinet.org/sites/default/files/attachment/outbreak-alert-2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UM5X4EUW]. See also RENEE JOHNSON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11092, FOODBORNE ILLNESS AND OUTBREAKS
FROM FRESH PRODUCE (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IF11092.pdf [https://perma.cc/PZ85-GU3F];
John A. Painter et al., Attribution of Foodborne Illnesses, Hospitalizations, and Deaths to Food
Commodities by Using Outbreak Data, United States, 1998-2008, 19 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES
407, 409–10 (2013) (finding that produce commodities accounted for 46 percent foodborne illness
outbreaks between 1996 and 2008 with an implicated food vehicle and a single etiological agent).
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Efforts to reduce foodborne illness involve diverse actors working in a
variety of institutional settings. The U.S. food safety system combines government
regulation at the federal, state, and local levels; industry supply chain management
supported by private food safety auditing; and civil liability and insurance
underwriting.7 This Article focuses on the last—and perhaps most obscure—of these
components.
The Article documents emerging efforts by private insurance companies to
regulate food safety on farms that grow fresh produce. Interviews with insurance
professionals reveal how underwriters employ a variety of techniques to encourage
compliance with government food safety regulations and conformity to industry
standards.8 These techniques include premium discounts for clients who adopt stateof-the-art food safety practices, coverage exclusions for high-risk activities, and loss
control advice about how to avoid contamination. Based on these findings, the
Article advocates expanding insurance to improve oversight in the U.S. food safety
system, and it offers specific recommendations for how to nurture emerging markets
for food safety coverage.9
Insurance could potentially be transformative in advancing food safety on
farms. Government regulation has traditionally been hampered by inadequate
inspection resources. Federal, state, and local agencies conduct routine inspections
of only a tiny fraction of the more than 120,000 U.S. farms that grow fresh produce
intended for retail sale to consumers.10 Significantly expanding the number of
government inspections would require either reallocating resources from other
programs, which would stretch agency budgets even thinner, or receiving large
funding increases, which seems politically unrealistic. By contrast, expanding
insurance generates revenue that underwriters can use to inspect and monitor farms.
Moreover, insurance is more reliable than other forms of private
governance. For example, in the fresh produce sector, private food safety auditors
inspect thousands of farms annually.11 These auditors are, for assorted reasons, often
paid by the growers and processors whom they audit.12 The resulting conflict of
interest among auditors, who are eager to maintain good relations with those who

7. For a detailed systems theory analysis of U.S. food safety governance, see LYTTON, supra note
3, at 21–22, 152–61, 236–38. For a description of what underwriting entails and the role of underwriters
in insurance, see infra Part V.A.
8. See infra Part V.D.
9. See infra Part IV.A.1.
10. This estimate of the number of U.S. farms that grow fresh produce for sale is from the FDA. U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA-2011-N-0921, STANDARDS FOR GROWING, HARVESTING, PACKING AND
HOLDING
OF
PRODUCE
FOR
HUMAN
CONSUMPTION
40
(2011),
https://www.fda.gov/files/about%20fda/published/Standards-for-the-Growing--Harvesting--Packingand-Holding-of-Produce-for-Human-Consumption-Regulatory-Impact-Analysis.pdf
[https://perma.cc/69PN-DRCX] [hereinafter Standards for Growing RIA]. For an estimate of the number
of routine annual food safety inspections by federal officials of farms that grow fresh produce, see
discussion infra Part III.C.1; see also LYTTON, supra note 3, at 206–08.
11. The scale of private food safety auditing far exceeds that of all federal and state inspections
combined. See discussion infra Part II.C.2; see also LYTTON, supra note 3, at 129, 208.
12. For an explanation of why food safety audits in the fresh produce sector are commonly paid for
by growers, see discussion infra Part II.C.2; see also LYTTON, supra note 3, at 208–10.
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pay them, leads some auditors to lower standards and cut corners.13 Insurance
companies are also paid by growers and processors. However, unlike private food
safety auditors, insurers stand to benefit from rigorous standards and careful
inspections aimed at reducing the risk of food safety failures that might generate
claims.
Beyond food safety, my findings regarding underwriting practices in the
fresh produce sector have important implications for understanding how insurance
regulates risk more generally. Economic analysis of many well-established types of
insurance—for example, life, health, homeowners, and auto—emphasizes the role of
actuarial data in pricing premiums, determining coverage limits, and informing loss
control advice.14 However, the underwriting professionals in this Article who
describe their efforts to improve food safety on farms operate in an emerging market
with a low volume of claims and a dearth of actuarial data.15 Three aspects of their
work stand out.
First, underwriting in this area is impressionistic rather than data driven.
Interviewees provided specific examples of how premium discounts, coverage
exclusions, and loss control advice encourage fresh produce growers to take food
safety precautions. However, these insurance incentives are not informed by
quantitative risk assessments. Instead, they are based on underwriters’ personal
intuitions about farming operations and anxiety prompted by large outbreaks, highprofile litigation, and costly settlements. It is often said that underwriting is more of
an art than a science.16 For underwriters evaluating food safety, this means relying
on their general impressions of salient risks without the benefit of robust actuarial
data.
Second, the mindset of these underwriters is more administrative than
economic. Rather than aspiring to an economic conception of optimal food safety
risk reduction, underwriting professionals aim for the more modest administrative
objectives of compliance with government regulations and conformity to industry
standards. In the fresh produce sector, these regulations and standards are, for the
most part, based on consensus among industry, academic, and government experts
with decades of experience attempting to reduce microbial contamination in growing
fields and processing facilities.17 However, none of these experts have been able to
demonstrate that any of the regulations or standards have been effective in reducing
foodborne illness. That is, although there is scientific evidence linking specific food
13. For a detailed analysis of conflict of interest in private food safety auditing and measures designed
to address it, see Timothy D. Lytton & Lesley K. McAllister, Oversight in Private Food Safety Auditing:
Addressing Auditor Conflict of Interest, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 289 (2014).
14. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces
Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197 (2012). Actuarial data are statistics used to calculate risk. Actuarial,
Vocabulary.com, https://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/actuarial.
15. For an explanation of the infrequency of claims in food safety insurance, see discussion infra Part
III.B.
16. E.g.,
Underwriting—art
or
science?,
ACTUARIAL
POST,
http://www.actuarialpost.co.uk/article/underwriting-art-or-science-2367.htm [https://perma.cc/4TKM8RGW] (reporting that a majority of invited guests at a debate hosted by Lloyd’s Marketing Association
voted in favor of a motion that underwriting is an art); see also RICHARD V. ERICSON & AARON DOYLE,
UNCERTAIN BUSINESS: RISK, INSURANCE, AND THE LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE 15 (2004).
17. See discussion infra Part II.B; see also LYTTON, supra note 3, at 162–69.
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safety precautions to reductions in microbial loads on fresh produce, there is no data
connecting reduced microbial loads to lower rates of human illness—a connection
that has, so far, eluded researchers due to incomplete disease surveillance data, the
rarity of successful root cause analysis in outbreak investigations, and limited
knowledge regarding what could be highly variable microbial load thresholds
necessary to trigger illness in different classes of individuals.18 The infrequency of
insurance claims arising out of foodborne illness—some interviewees report never
having seen one—renders insurance companies as incapable of assessing the
effectiveness and efficiency of specific food safety measures in reducing foodborne
illness as everyone else.19 The tendency to manage what one can measure leads
insurance carriers to focus their risk management efforts on the measurable metrics
of regulatory compliance and standards conformity rather than the elusive goal of
optimal risk reduction.20
Third, the capacity of insurance to incentivize regulatory compliance and
standards conformity varies according to the size of premiums, which in turn depends
on farm size. Larger premiums are necessary to pay for detailed inspections of
farming operations and the technical expertise necessary to educate underwriters and
advise policyholders. Insurance is like many other products: you get what you pay
for. Accordingly, risk reduction efforts are more prevalent when insurance
companies are underwriting agribusiness policyholders willing to pay high
premiums than when they insure small farmers operating on thin margins.
Thus, the account presented here reveals that, when it comes to emerging
markets, risk regulation through insurance is likely to be impressionistic rather than
data driven, focused on compliance instead of optimal risk reduction, and dependent
on the capacity of policyholders to pay premiums large enough to pay for inspections
and expertise.
The Article is organized into six parts. Part I situates my analysis within the
academic literature by legal scholars, economists, and sociologists on insurance as
regulation. It also provides details about my methodology and study design. Part II
presents an overview of food safety regulation in the fresh produce sector. Part III
explains why it is so difficult to identify the root causes of foodborne illness and how
this problem impacts the use of insurance as a means of risk reduction. Part IV
surveys the various types of insurance that cover food safety risks associated with
fresh produce. Part V describes how insurance professionals take food safety risk
18. For fuller analysis of how little is known about the efficacy and efficiency of food safety efforts,
see LYTTON, supra note 3, at 62–64 (fluid milk), 108–13 (meat & poultry), 163–69 (produce), 232–34,
240–41 (generally); see also Travis Minor & Matt Parrett, The Economic Impact of the Food and Drug
Administration’s Final Juice HACCP Rule, 68 FOOD POLICY 206, 210–11 (2017) (estimating that food
safety rules governing the production of juices “led to an annual reduction of between 462 and 508
foodborne illnesses” using CDC foodborne illness surveillance data). For a discussion of various
methodologies for measuring the impact of food safety regulations, see Maddalena Ragona & Mario
Mazzocchi, Measuring the Impacts of Food Safety Regulations: A Methodological Review, 12th Congress
of the European Association of Agricultural Economics (2018), DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.43864
[https://perma.cc/XZQ8-4ANP].
19. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
20. For a leading study on how insurance companies serve as compliance managers, see Shauhin A.
Talesh, Data Breach, Privacy, and Cyber Insurance: How Insurance Companies Act as “Compliance
Managers” for Business, 43 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 417 (2018).

288

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 52

into account in the design, sale, and administration of insurance for fresh produce
growers. Part VI assesses of the capacity of insurance to reduce food safety risk in
the fresh produce sector and offers recommendations for enhancing that capacity.
Part VI also discusses the implications of this case study for understanding insurance
as a form of risk regulation more generally.
I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK & METHODOLOGY
This case study of food safety coverage in the fresh produce sector
contributes to a robust academic literature on insurance as regulation. In the area of
food safety, scholars have relied heavily on theoretical economic analysis. The
interviews conducted for this study offer new empirical data and a sociolegal
perspective that supports a more complete picture of how insurance regulates food
safety risk.
A. Insurance as Regulation
Insurance has traditionally been understood as a means of pooling risk to
shield policyholders from the potentially ruinous financial consequences of
unexpected harms.21 One downside of insurance is that, by relieving policyholders
of financial responsibility for accidents, insurance eliminates an important incentive
for them to exercise care, which could increase the risk of accidents. Economists
refer to this as the problem of moral hazard.22 To address the problem, insurance
providers frequently create new incentives for policyholders to reduce risk.23 As
legal scholars Tom Baker and Rick Swedloff explain: “Once an insurer underwrites
a risk, the insurer has every reason to try to reduce its payouts by encouraging
insureds to prevent the potential loss from materializing. That can, and sometimes
does, lead insurers to attempt to regulate loss-producing activities.”24
Numerous case studies describe how insurers employ a variety of
techniques to reduce risk.25 These techniques include premium discounts for
21. Julia
Kagan,
Insurance,
INVESTOPEDIA
(Mar.
25,
2020)
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/insurance.asp [https://perma.cc/YG2M-L4FX].
22. Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 531 (1968); see
also Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q.J. ECON. 541 (1979); Tom Baker, On the
Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996).
23. See, e.g., Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff, Regulation by Liability Insurance: From Auto to Lawyers
Professional Liability, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1412 (2013); see also Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 14; Haito
Yin, Howard Kunreuther & Matthew White, Risk-Based Pricing and Risk-Reducing Effort: Does the
Private Insurance Market Reduce Environmental Accidents?, 5 J.L. & ECON. 325 (2011); RICHARD V.
ERICSON, AARON DOYLE & DEAN BARRY, INSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE (2003); CAROL A. HEIMER,
REACTIVE RISK AND RATIONAL ACTION: MANAGING MORAL HAZARD IN INSURANCE CONTRACTS 42-48
(1985).
24. Baker & Swedloff, supra note 23, at 1415; see also Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 14, at 199.
25. See, e.g., Baker & Swedloff, supra note 23 (analyzing auto insurance, professional malpractice
insurance, commercial general liability insurance, directors and officers liability insurance); Ben-Shahar
& Logue, supra note 14 (analyzing products liability insurance, workers’ compensation insurance, auto
insurance, homeowners’ insurance, environmental liability insurance, tax liability insurance); see
generally Tom Baker & Charles Silver, How Liability Insurers Protect Patients and Improve Safety, 68
DEPAUL L. REV. 209 (2019) (analyzing medical malpractice insurance); Shauhin Talesh, Legal
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policyholders who adopt precautions, coverage exclusions for high-risk activities,
and loss control advice about how to avoid accidents that might give rise to claims.26
However, not all insurers provide incentives to reduce risk. Underwriters in a
particular field of insurance may lack sufficient knowledge and experience to
calculate discounts, design exclusions, or offer advice. It may be prohibitively costly
for insurers to inspect the operations of policyholders and to monitor their conduct.27
Moreover, in some cases, insurance may undermine government risk regulation. For
example, insurers sometimes coach policyholders in how to avoid legal liability
without avoiding the conduct that liability is supposed to deter.28 Thus, according to
legal scholar Shauhin Talesh, insurance as a form of risk regulation is a mixed bag
of “the good, the bad, and the ugly.”29
When it comes to food safety, scholars disagree about the capacity of
insurance to reduce risk. On one side of this disagreement, Omri Ben-Shahar and
Kyle Logue assert that insurers are uniquely motivated and equipped to assess the
individual risk profile of different operations, tailor incentives to reduce those risks,
and monitor compliance with requirements and recommendations.30 Insurers are
motivated to price risk accurately since “insurers that set inaccurate premiums . . .
would suffer a loss of profit and, at the limit, would be competed out of business
entirely.”31 Insurers are equipped with “a centralized network of agents,” including
underwriters, loss control experts, and adjusters to monitor compliance.32 BenShahar and Logue predict that widespread food product liability insurance would
“generate incentives for optimal safety” and they recommend compulsory liability
insurance for all food producers.33

Intermediaries: How Insurance Companies Construct the Meaning of Compliance with
Antidiscrimination Laws, 37 L. & POL’Y 209 (2015) (employment practices liability insurance); John
Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1541 (2017) (analyzing
liability insurance for police misconduct); Shauhin Talesh, Data Breach, Privacy, and Cyber Insurance:
How Insurance Companies Act as “Compliance Managers” for Businesses, 43 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 417
(2018) (analyzing cyber insurance).
26. See, e.g., Baker & Swedloff, supra note 23; Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 14; Talesh, Data
Breach, supra note 25.
27. See, e.g., TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: HOW
LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 118–24 (2010) (discussing the lack of
risk reduction efforts among underwriters of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance); see also Shauhin
Talesh, Insurance Companies as Corporate Regulators: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly, 66 DEPAUL
L. REV. 463, 490 n.122 (2017).
28. Talesh, Legal Intermediaries, supra note 25 (describing how insurers who provide employment
practices liability insurance help employers avoid liability without reducing discriminatory practices in
the workplace); see also Tom Baker & Peter Siegelman, The Law and Economics of Liability Insurance:
A Theoretical and Empirical Review, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS 180, n.15
(Jennifer Arlen ed., 2013) (distinguishing liability prevention from loss prevention).
29. Talesh, Insurance Companies, supra note 27.
30. Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 14, at 232–37.
31. Id. at 234.
32. Id. at 234, 236–37.
33. Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 14, at 243–45; see also ELIZA M. MOJDUSZKA, PRIVATE AND
PUBLIC FOOD SAFETY CONTROL MECHANISMS: INTERDEPENDENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS (2004),
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/19987/files/sp04mo07.pdf [https://perma.cc/93H2-H42D].
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On the other side of the disagreement, John Cogan argues that the inability
of most foodborne illness victims to identify the producer of the contaminated food
that sickened them makes viable tort claims extremely rare, which “significantly
impedes the effectiveness of food safety liability insurance as a regulator of food
safety.”34 According to Cogan, food safety liability insurance premiums reflect the
very low risk of being sued rather than the higher risk of harm to consumers, and
such premiums cannot provide policyholders adequate incentive to exercise optimal
care.35 The signal such premiums send is likely to lead food companies to
underestimate the risk that their operations will harm consumers and to underinvest
in food safety.36 Moreover, low litigation rates result in few insurance claims, which
deprives insurance companies of the risk information necessary to establish optimal
eligibility requirements, premium discounts, and coverage terms, and to provide
useful risk management advice.37
One point on which these competing accounts agree is that product
contamination insurance, which covers a policyholder’s first-party losses arising out
of recalls, creates incentives to mitigate the risk of foodborne illness from
contaminated food.38 Without such insurance, food producers, who face little
prospect of being sued, may be reluctant to spend money on costly and timeconsuming recalls of contaminated food. Cogan explains that recall coverage reduces
the burden of recalling contaminated food, “thereby promoting more timely recalls
when a supplier’s products pose risks to the public health and helping to remove
dangerous products from the market.”39
B. Beyond Economic Analysis
These accounts of insurance as a means of regulating food safety risk rely
heavily on theoretical economic analysis. This Article adds a sociolegal
perspective.40 Economic analysis suggests that uncertainty undermines the capacity
of insurance to efficiently price and effectively manage food safety risk. However,

34. John Aloysius Cogan, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Food Safety Liability, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 1495,
1502 (2016). For a detailed analysis of why tort claims arising out of foodborne illness are so rare, see
infra Part III.
35. Id. at 1503, 1537–42. For a discussion of low litigation rates for foodborne illness, see JEAN C.
BUZBY, PAUL D. FRENZEN & BARBARA RASCO, PRODUCT LIABILITY AND MICROBIAL FOODBORNE
ILLNESS, AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIC REPORT NO. 799 (Econ. Rsch. Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., ed.,
2001),
https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/41289/19018_aer799b.pdf?v=0.
[https://perma.cc/54YH-QRE7].
36. Cogan, supra note 34, at 1542–44, 1550.
37. Id. at 1544–45.
38. First-party losses are losses suffered by the person named in the insurance policy.
INTERNATIONAL
RISK
MANAGEMENT
INSTITUTE,
FIRST-PARTY
INSURANCE
(2021),
https://www.irmi.com/term/insurance-definitions/first-partyinsurance#:~:text=First%2Dparty%20insurance%20that%20indemnifies,such%20as%20fire%20or%20e
xplosion.
39. Cogan, supra note 34, at 1551; see also Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 14, at 243–45; Jerry R.
Skees, Aleta Botts & Kimberly A. Zeuli, The Potential for Recall Insurance to Improve Food Safety, 4
INT’L FOOD & AGRIBUSINESS MGMT. REV. 99 (2001).
40. For a general introduction to sociolegal theory, see STEWART MACAULAY & LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, LAW IN ACTION: A SOCIO-LEGAL READER (2007).
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the interviews conducted for this Article reveal that, in the absence of robust actuarial
data, insurers manage risk by incentivizing farmers to comply with government
regulations and conform to industry standards. Uncertainty may complicate the task
of underwriters and limit what they can achieve, but it does not eliminate the value
of insurance to risk regulation.
Indeed, new forms of insurance have always emerged in the absence of
robust risk information.41 As sociologists Richard Ericson and Aaron Doyle put it,
uncertainty is not an obstacle to insurance but rather the business of insurance. “[A]
high degree of scientific and technical uncertainty permeates the insurance industry”
but “insurers do not necessarily back off. . . . Rather, they respond with a range of
creative and sometimes ingenious solutions.”42 As Tom Baker explains, “the ideal
type of a fixed-in-advance, distribution of determinable risks does not match the
reality of insurance markets.”43
It is true that insurance does not currently generate sufficient actuarial data
to reduce the uncertainty that plagues efforts by government regulators, industry
technical committees, and academic experts to identify an optimal level of food
safety. Nevertheless, insurance does contribute potentially powerful and pervasive
incentives to encourage compliance with food safety standards developed by those
groups. Insurance in this sector does not provide information to improve the
effectiveness or efficiency of health and safety standards, but it does play a role in
implementing them.
Appraisals of the role of insurance in reducing food safety risk need not rely
exclusively on economic analysis. Researchers can also investigate underwriting
practices. Based on semi-structured interviews with agents, underwriters, loss
control specialists, claims adjusters, and product managers, this Article develops a
thick description of how insurance professionals factor food safety risk into
insurance coverage for fresh produce farmers.44
C. Study Design
Before proceeding further, it is important to clarify the nature and scope of
the interviews that support the analysis that follows. The author and two research
assistants conducted semi-structured one-hour interviews with thirty-five insurance
professionals between August 2013 and May 2020.45 The interviews followed a set
of common questions. Interviews were conducted by telephone and audio recorded,
and then transcribed. The author coded and analyzed the transcripts using NVivo
software.
41. ERICSON & DOYLE, UNCERTAIN BUSINESS, supra note 16, at 285 (noting that, in many different
areas, “insurers have operated with little or no systematic knowledge of risk”).
42. Id. at 5.
43. Tom Baker, Uncertainty > Risk: Lessons for Legal Thought from the Insurance Runoff Market,
61 B.C. L. REV. 59, 65 (2020).
44. For details on sampling procedures for these interviews, see infra note 46 and accompanying text.
For a definition of thick description, see Chris Drew, 5 Key Principles of “Thick Description” in Research
(2020),
HELPFUL
PROFESSOR
(undated),
https://helpfulprofessor.com/thick-description/
[https://perma.cc/47BD-TRY4].
45. The author conducted twenty-five interviews between August 2013 and December 2019. The
research assistants conducted ten interviews between October 2019 and May 2020.
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Interview subjects were identified through recommendations by prominent
food safety experts, an internet search of agents and carriers that offer liability and
contamination coverage for farms, and additional contacts obtained from initial
subjects.46 The author and his research assistants contacted more than 100 managers
and senior executives at agencies, brokerages, insurance companies, and consulting
firms by phone or email message or both, typically more than once. Most individuals
did not respond to these contact attempts, some responded but explained that their
firms did not work with fresh produce farms, and a few declined without providing
any reason. The contact attempts yielded twenty-seven interviews with thirty-five
individuals (some interviews included more than one interview subject). Interview
subjects included six agents, four brokers, fourteen underwriting managers, two loss
control experts, two claims managers, two product managers, one legal advisor, one
data analyst, and three independent consultants. To complement the data collected
from these interviews, this Article relies on content analysis of promotional materials
for farm and agribusiness insurance, application and coverage forms, underwriting
guidelines, and inspection checklists.
Interview subjects’ years of experience doing insurance-related work
ranged from one to forty-seven years. The thirty-five interview subjects averaged
twenty-three years of experience, which was also the median number of years of
experience in the group. Together, the group had a combined 836 years of
experience.
Some interview subjects offered their services exclusively in regional
markets, while others served a national client base. Those interview subjects who are
employed by insurance carriers are from companies that collectively represented
28.5 percent of the U.S. market for farm owners multiple peril insurance in 2016,
consisting of $1.2 billion in direct premiums written.47 Within leading fresh produce
states, these carriers represented an even greater market share—for example, 75
percent in California and 80 percent in Florida.48 The carriers also represented 27
percent of the U.S. market for commercial multiple peril insurance in 2018, as
46. The prominent food safety experts were themselves the subjects of semi-structured interviews as
part of the author’s research. LYTTON, supra note 3. The internet search produced a list of 358 contacts.
Obtaining additional contacts from initial subjects is known as snowball sampling. Stephanie Glen,
Snowball Sampling: Definition, Advantages and Disadvantages, STATISTICS HOW TO,
https://www.statisticshowto.com/snowball-sampling/; see also JOHN LOFLAND ET AL., ANALYZING
SOCIAL SETTINGS: A GUIDE TO QUALITATIVE OBSERVATION AND ANALYSIS 41–43 (4th ed. 2006).
47. Multiple peril insurance is insurance that covers a number of different causes of loss in a single
policy. Multi-peril Policy, INSURANCEOPEDIA, https://www.insuranceopedia.com/definition/421/multiperil-policy (Jan. 27, 2017). For data on the U.S. market for multiple peril insurance, see generally S&P
GLOB. MKT. INTEL., FARMOWNERS MULTIPLE PERIL 2016 INDUSTRY ANALYSIS (2017),
https://www.aaic.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Farmowners-Multiple-Peril-2016-Industry-AnalysisReport.pdf. The report defines market share as “the percentage of a company’s direct premiums written
for specific lines of business within a specific area over the entire industry’s direct premiums written with
the same parameters.” Id. at 71. Direct premiums are “[p]remiums written including gross premiums
booked, adjusted for additional or return premiums, on policies where the company is the primary or direct
carrier, as it relates to a specific line of business.” Id.
48. FARMOWNERS MULTIPLE PERIL 2016 INDUSTRY ANALYSIS, supra note 47, at 10, 14. For data on
fresh produce cultivation and sales by state, see State Profiles of Produce Across America, UNITED FRESH
PRODUCE ASSOCIATION (2020), https://www.unitedfresh.org/advocacy/state-profiles-of-produce-acrossamerica/ [https://perma.cc/6Z4L-UEJS].
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measured by direct premiums written, and included several leading product
contamination carriers.49
Many insurance professionals are reticent to discuss the details of
underwriting practices within their companies for fear of disclosing proprietary
information that could benefit competitors. All the interview subjects in this study
consented to being quoted in this and other publications, but some requested that
they and their companies remain anonymous. Consequently, the discussion below
does not disclose the identities of any of the interview subjects or the companies with
which they are associated. Having presented the theoretical framework and
methodology for this study, Part II next situates insurance within the complex
regulatory infrastructure that governs food safety.
II. FOOD SAFETY REGULATION IN THE FRESH PRODUCE SECTOR
Food safety regulation covers a broad array of risks, regulated activities,
and regulators. The risks encompass dangers posed by microbial pathogens, food
additives, pesticide exposure, antibiotics in animal feed, chemical contamination,
foreign objects, and genetically modified organisms. The regulated activities span
diverse industries, each with its own history, culture, modes of production, and
methods of distribution.50 The regulators include fifteen different federal agencies
administering thirty-five different laws, as well as a much larger number of state and
local entities.51 Moreover, all this government regulation is only one component of
a larger infrastructure of food safety governance, which includes industry supply
chain management and private food safety auditing, as well as civil liability and
insurance underwriting. These various public and private governance efforts are
highly interdependent.52 The food safety professionals involved in these efforts
communicate, collaborate and, over the course of their careers, frequently migrate
between jobs in government, industry, and academia.53 This complex system of
public and private entities engaged in regulatory governance is what scholars refer
to as a “risk regime.”54
49. See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, 2018 MARKET SHARE REPORTS FOR PROPERTY/CASUALTY
GROUPS
AND
COMPANIES
BY
STATE
AND
COUNTRYWIDE
185
(2019),
https://www.naic.org/prod_serv/MSR-PB-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/VJ6D-7NS9]; see also AON, 2019
EMERGING TRENDS IN PRODUCT RECALL AND CONTAMINATION RISK MANAGEMENT 15–18 (2019),
https://www.aon.com/forms/2018/2018-emerging-trends-product-recall.jsp.
50. For detailed case studies of food safety regulation in various industries, including fluid milk, beef
and poultry, fresh produce, and food service, see LYTTON, supra note 3.
51. See Lisa Heinzerling, Divide and Confound: The Strange Allocation of U.S. Regulatory Authority
Over Food, in FOOD AND DRUG REGULATION IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZED MARKETS 126 (Sam F. Halabi
ed., 2015). See also RENÉE JOHNSON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., THE FEDERAL FOOD SAFETY SYSTEM: A
PRIMER (2016). For an introduction to state and local regulation of food safety and ongoing coordination
efforts, see History of AFDO, ASS’N OF FOOD AND DRUG OFFS., http://www.afdo.org/History.
52. For a detailed systems theory analysis of U.S. food safety governance, see LYTTON, supra note
3, at 21–22, 152–61, 236–38.
53. On professional networks in food safety governance, see LYTTON, supra note 3, at 22, 46, 49–
51, 153, 155, 198–99, 237.
54. For an analysis of food safety governance as a risk regime, see Timothy D. Lytton, Technical
Standards in Health and Safety Regulation: Risk Regimes, the New Administrative Law, and Food Safety
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This Article drills down into one specific area within the U.S. food safety
risk regime—the use of liability and product contamination insurance to reduce
microbial contamination of fresh produce in farming operations. Detailed analysis of
underwriting practices in this area will yield lessons about the role of insurance in
reducing food safety risk beyond fresh produce and the use of insurance as a form of
regulatory governance more generally. But first, Part II provides essential
background concerning the regulation of food safety on farms that grow fresh
produce.
A. Risks
Fresh produce presents several unique food safety challenges. It is typically
grown outdoors, where it is exposed to many potential sources of contamination—
including feces from livestock and wildlife, and microbial pathogens carried by
irrigation water, organic fertilizers, agricultural and urban pollution, insects,
fieldworkers, and harvesting equipment.55 Risk management in the field is especially
important because fresh produce is frequently consumed raw, which forecloses the
use of cooking to kill harmful pathogens during processing or home preparation.56
Governance, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW, VOL. 2:
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, COPYRIGHT, TRADEMARK, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 45 (Jorge L. Contreras ed.,
2019) [hereinafter Technical Standards]. On risk regimes more generally, see Jody Freeman, Private
Parties, Public Functions and the New Administrative Law, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 813, 816 (2000) (noting
that “[c]ontemporary regulation might be best described as a regime of ‘mixed administration’ in which
private actors and government share regulatory roles”); CHRISTOPHER HOOD ET AL., THE GOVERNMENT
OF RISK: UNDERSTANDING RISK REGULATION REGIMES 9 (2001) (defining a risk regime as “the complex
of institutional geography, rules, practice, and animating ideas that are associated with the regulation of a
particular risk or hazard”).
55. Susan Bach & Pascal Delaquis, The Origin and Spread of Human Pathogens in Fruit Production
Systems, in MICROBIAL SAFETY OF FRESH PRODUCE 45–46 (Xuetong Fan ed., 2009).
56. See generally Food Safety: Current Challenges and New Ideas to Safeguard Consumers: Hearing
on Examining Current Challenges and New Ideas to Safeguard Consumers Relating to Food Safety,
Focusing on Foodborne Illnesses in General and the Response to the Recent Outbreak of E. Coli
Infections Associated with Fresh Spinach Before the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and
Pensions, 109th Cong. 36–37, 92; M. F. Lynch et al., The Growing Burden of Foodborne Outbreaks Due
to Contaminated Fresh Produce: Risks and Opportunities, 137 EPIDEMIOLOGY & INFECTION 307 (2009).
Washing fresh produce with chlorinated water reduces pathogen levels but is not 100 percent effective.
Indeed, if not properly monitored, wash water can be a vehicle for cross contamination. See Julie Schmit,
Tainted Spinach: All Bacteria May Not Come Out in the Wash, USA TODAY (Oct. 5, 2006),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/food/20061004spinachwashusat_x.htm
[https://perma.cc/9V52-T2CT]; Roy Costa, The Packinghouse: Safety and Uses of Process- Water, FOOD
SAFETY NEWS (Mar. 18, 2015), https://www.foodsafetynews.com/2015/03/the-packinghouse-safety-anduses-of-process-water/;
CTR. FOR PRODUCE SAFETY,
KEY LEARNINGS
9
(2014),
https://www.centerforproducesafety.org/amass/documents/document/210/CPS%20Key%20Learnings%
20May%202014_FINAL2.pdf; Study: Fresh Produce Bacteria Can Thrive Despite Routine Chlorine
Sanitizing, FOOD SAFETY MAG. (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.foodsafetymagazine.com/news/study-freshproduce-bacteria-can-thrive-despite-routine-chlorine-sanitizing/?mobileFormat=false. Irradiation also
reduces pathogen levels. However, it has not been widely adopted because the necessary equipment is
expensive, and companies fear that many consumers will not purchase irradiated food. MARION NESTLE,
SAFE FOOD: THE POLITICS OF FOOD SAFETY 121–26 (2d ed. 2010); Xuetong Fan et al., Irradiation of
Fresh Fruits and Vegetables, FOOD TECH. MAG. (Mar. 1, 2008), https://www.ift.org/news-andpublications/food-technology-magazine/issues/2008/march/features/irradiation-of-fresh-fruits-andvegetables.
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Produce that has been cut and processed—for example, in bagged salad
mixes—carries additional risks. Cutting breaks the protective exterior skin of the
plant and allows pathogens to infiltrate stalks and leaves, where they are harder to
remove.57 Cutting also releases cellular fluids that provide a nutritive medium that
can foster pathogen growth.58 The cutting, washing, and mixing of packaged items
exposes them to additional handling, thereby multiplying opportunities for
contamination.59 The aggregation of batches from different farms during processing
increases the risk of cross contamination and can disperse a single contaminated
item, such as a spinach plant or head of lettuce, into many finished products.60
B. Standards
Food safety standards governing fresh produce take diverse forms and
emanate from many sources.61 Standards take the form of industry guidelines, agency
guidance, product specifications, private auditing criteria, marketing agreements,
and regulations. The entities that promulgate these standards include trade
associations, government agencies, retailers, and standards development
organizations. Although there is some variation between different sets of standards,
extensive borrowing among these entities produces considerable overlap. Each new
set of standards is typically modeled on some preexisting set and slightly modified.
Periodic foodborne illness outbreaks traced back to fresh produce frequently prompt
these revisions.62
During the past two decades, the standards have evolved from vague
voluntary guidelines to detailed binding rules. However, much of the additional
specification in the newer standards is unsupported by scientific evidence.63 The
following thumbnail history of food safety standards for fresh produce describes how
the push for mandates and metrics has advanced despite the absence of scientific
evidence to justify them.

57. A. Bryan Endres & Nicholas R. Johnson, Integrating Stakeholder Roles in Food Production,
Marketing, and Safety Systems: An Evolving Multi-Jurisdictional Approach, 26 J. OF ENVT’L L. & LITIG.
29, 53–54 (2011).
58. Id. at 53; Elliot T. Ryser et al., Internalization of Pathogens in Produce, in MICROBIAL SAFETY
OF FRESH PRODUCE 55–80 (Xuetong Fan ed., 2009).
59. Endres & Johnson, supra note 57, at 53–54.
60. Id.
61. For a more detailed account of the overview provided in this and the next paragraph, see LYTTON,
supra note 3, at 121–61.
62. For an analysis of how foodborne illness outbreaks function as focusing events that prompt food
safety reforms, see LYTTON, supra note 3, at 113–17, 236.
63. See LYTTON, supra note 3, at 162–69 (discussing the lack of available evidence to support any
claims about the impact of food safety standards governing fresh produce on foodborne illness rates and
reviewing evidence of increased expenditures on food safety measures among farmers and increased rates
of regulatory compliance and standards conformity).
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1. Voluntary Guidelines and Nonbinding Guidance
Food safety concerns about fresh produce are relatively recent.64 A 1985
National Academies report asserted that “raw fruits and vegetables are not common
causes of foodborne illness in the United States,” and that “there is little use for
microbiological [safety standards] for fresh fruits and vegetables at the present
time.”65 At that time, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had long
possessed broad legal authority under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act to
prevent adulteration of any type of food sold in interstate commerce, but it had never
developed implementing regulations for fresh produce as it had for processed
foods.66
Complacency about the safety of fresh produce ended when, in the mid1990s, public health officials began identifying contaminated fresh produce as the
source of foodborne illness outbreaks. Increased consumption of raw produce as part
of changing dietary patterns that favored fresh salads over cooked vegetables likely
contributed to a rise in outbreaks.67 Simultaneously, improvements in foodborne
illness surveillance and tracing enhanced the ability of public health officials to
connect outbreaks to specific products and companies.68
In response to growing concern about the safety of fresh produce, several
trade associations assembled technical committees composed of industry experts,
academics, and government officials.69 In 1997, these trade associations published
two sets of similar voluntary guidelines that identified five potential sources of
contamination in growing fields: agricultural water quality, soil amendments, animal
intrusion, worker hygiene, and harvesting equipment.70 These early guidelines
directed attention to potential problem areas but did not specify metrics or provide
detailed procedures for reducing risk. For example, one set of guidelines on irrigation
water encouraged growers “to identify and review the source of water” and suggested
that “[t]he water may be tested for contaminants on a periodic basis. The frequency
of the testing may be determined by the water source. Testing may be considered for

64. This and the next paragraph are drawn from Lytton, Technical Standards, supra note 54, at 47.
For a more detailed account of the history of food safety standards in the fresh produce sector, see
LYTTON, supra note 3, at 121–47.
65. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., AN EVALUATION OF THE ROLE OF MICROBIOLOGICAL CRITERIA FOR
FOODS AND FOOD INGREDIENTS, 257–58 (1985).
66. See VANESSA K. BURROWS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., FDA AUTHORITY TO REGULATE ON-FARM
ACTIVITY (2008); Varun Shekhar, Produce Exceptionalism: Examining the Leafy Greens Marketing
Agreement and Its Ability to Improve Food Safety, 6 J. FOOD L. & POLICY 267 (2010).
67. Matthew Kohnke, Note, Reeling in a Rogue Industry: Lethal E. Coli in California’s Leafy Green
Produce & the Regulatory Response, 12 DRAKE J. OF AGRIC. L. 493 (2007).
68. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: GUIDE TO MINIMIZE MICROBIAL FOOD
SAFETY HAZARDS OF FRESH-CUT FRUITS AND VEGETABLES (2008).
69. Lytton, supra note 54, at 47. For a list of participants and their institutional affiliations, see INT’L
FRESH-CUT PRODUCE ASS’N & W. GROWERS ASS’N, VOLUNTARY FOOD SAFETY GUIDELINES FOR FRESH
PRODUCE: VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES FOR MINIMIZING MICROBIAL CONTAMINATION IN FRESH PRODUCE
iv–v (1997); UNITED FRESH FRUIT & VEGETABLE ASS’N, INDUSTRYWIDE GUIDANCE TO MINIMIZE
MICROBIOLOGICAL FOOD SAFETY RISKS FOR PRODUCE i (1997).
70. INT’L FRESH-CUT PRODUCE ASS’N, supra note 69, at 1–3; UNITED FRESH FRUIT & VEGETABLE
ASS’N, supra note 69, at 5–14.
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E. coli and total coliforms.”71 (Although not harmful to humans, generic E. coli and
most coliforms are indicators of fecal contamination, which may be accompanied by
pathogenic bacteria.)72 The authors of the guidelines readily admitted a lack of
scientific evidence to support more specific standards or detailed testing procedures.
The introduction to one set of guidelines acknowledged that
There are data gaps in understanding the sources and significance
of microbial hazards as well as practices to minimize them.
Consequently, it is not well understood what specific impact water,
manure or employees may have in contributing to foodborne
disease.73
The following year, the FDA and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
jointly issued a nonbinding guidance document titled, Guide to Minimize Microbial
Food Safety Hazards for Fresh Fruits and Vegetables, which borrowed heavily from
the industry association guidelines, as well as from another set of guidelines
concurrently developed by researchers at Cornell University.74 Like its industry and
academic predecessors, the federal government’s guidance highlighted areas of
concern but lacked specific metrics or detailed procedures. For example, the
guidance stated that agricultural “water quality [should be] adequate for its intended
use” and defined adequate as “that which is needed to accomplish the intended
purpose in keeping with good practice.”75 The guidance advised that “where water
quality is unknown or cannot be controlled, growers should use other good
agricultural practices to minimize the risk of contamination,” such as “protecting
surface waters, wells, and pump areas from uncontrolled livestock or wildlife access
to limit the extent of fecal contamination” and employing “soil and water
conservation practices such as grass/sod waterways, diversion berms, runoff control
structures, and vegetative buffer areas” to “help prevent polluted runoff water from
contaminating agricultural water sources and produce crops.”76 The guidance offered
71. INT’L FRESH-CUT PRODUCE ASS’N, supra note 69, at 2. For similarly vague guidelines on
agricultural water quality, see UNITED FRESH FRUIT & VEGETABLE ASS’N, supra note 69, at 8.
72. Frequently Asked Questions About Coliforms in Drinking Water, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
&
PREVENTION
(Mar.
2013),
https://www.cdc.gov/healthywater/emergency/dwa-commtoolbox/before/tools/faq-coliforms-drinking-water.docx.
73. INT’L FRESH-CUT PRODUCE ASS’N, supra note 69, at iii; see also UNITED FRESH FRUIT &
VEGETABLE ASS’N, supra note 69, at 4 (acknowledging that “further research is essential to understand
more fully the risks and effectiveness of intervention measures”).
74. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: GUIDE TO MINIMIZE MICROBIAL FOOD
SAFETY HAZARDS FOR FRESH FRUITS AND VEGETABLES (1998) [hereinafter FDA 1998 Guidance];
ANUSUYA RANGARAJAN, MARVIN P. PRITTS, STEVE REINERS, & LAURA PEDERSEN, FOOD SAFETY
BEGINS ON THE FARM: REDUCE MICROBIAL CONTAMINATION WITH GOOD AGRICULTURAL PRACTICES
(rev. 2000) (guidelines published in a tri-fold pamphlet by the Cornell University GAPs Project,
Department of Food Science). This pamphlet was first published in 1997. For further details on dating the
first edition, see LYTTON, supra note 3, at 295 n. 13. For a more detailed account of the drafting of the
FDA/USDA guidance, see LYTTON, supra note 3, at 124.
75. FDA 1998 Guidance, supra note 74, at 6, 13.
76. Id. at 10, 12. The good agricultural practices recommended by the FDA/USDA guidance are
commonly referred by the acronym “GAPs.” Robert B. Gravani, The Role of Good Agricultural Practices
in Produce Safety, in MICROBIAL SAFETY OF FRESH PRODUCE 108 (Xuetong Fan, Brendan A. Niemira,
Christopher J. Doona, Florence E. Feeherry & Robert B. Gravani eds., 2009).
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no details on how to protect water sources from animal intrusion or specifications
for earthworks to divert runoff water. Similarly, the guidance stated that “[g]rowers
may elect to test their water supply for microbial contamination” but, as one
commentator points out, the guidance did not specify “what to test for, what type of
test to utilize, where to test, what the frequency of tests should be or any parameters
upon which to evaluate the results of [the] tests.”77
As did the industry guidelines, the government’s guidance highlighted the
inadequacy of scientific knowledge at the time and the need for additional research.
The FDA and USDA explained that “[t]he scientific basis for reducing or eliminating
pathogens in an agricultural setting is evolving and not yet complete.”78 For example,
they cautioned that “[t]here are a number of gaps in the science upon which to base
a microbial testing program for agricultural water[,] and microbial testing of
agricultural water may be of limited usefulness.”79
Concern over microbial contamination of fresh produce grew in the years
following publication of the industry guidelines and government guidance.
Frustrated, in 2004, the FDA issued a letter to fresh lettuce and tomato growers
complaining that, since 1996, the agency had “responded to [fourteen] outbreaks of
foodborne illness for which fresh lettuce or fresh tomatoes were the confirmed or
suspected vehicle[s]” causing “approximately 859 reported cases of illness” caused
by E. coli O157:H7, Salmonella, Cyclospora, and Hepatitis A virus.80 In a
subsequent 2005 letter to California leafy green growers, the agency demanded that
the industry develop a “comprehensive, collaborative plan to address the issue of E.
coli O157:H7 in lettuce” and threatened product seizures and prosecutions if more
was not done to clean up the state’s lettuce fields.81
These ongoing outbreaks also worried the retail businesses that sold and
served contaminated fresh produce to their customers. Eager to protect their brands
from the reputational damage of outbreaks, supermarkets, restaurant chains, and food
service companies incorporated food safety standards into the product specifications
they required from their suppliers. In addition, retail trade associations launched
independent standard-setting entities to develop industrywide food safety standards,
known as “schemes.” Well-established standards organizations, such as the
Underwriters’ Laboratories (UL) and the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO), also developed food safety standards. Retailers insisted that
their fresh produce suppliers obtain food safety audits and earn specified minimum
scores or ratings. Private auditors offered a menu of options based on different
standards, including, in some cases, branded audits using an audit firm’s own
proprietary standards. As new standards and audit requirements proliferated,
growers—subject to multiple audits to please different buyers—complained of
77. FDA 1998 Guidance, supra note 74, at 12; Endres & Johnson, supra note 57, at 61–62 (quoting
a comment made during a public hearing convened by the USDA on food safety standards for leafy greens
cultivation).
78. FDA 1998 Guidance, supra note 74, at 3.
79. Id. at 12.
80. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Letter to Firms that Grow, Pack, or Ship Fresh Lettuce and Fresh
Tomatoes (Feb. 5, 2004).
81. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Letter to California Firms that Grow, Pack, Process, or Ship Fresh
and Fresh-cut Lettuce (Nov. 4, 2005).
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“audit fatigue.” In response, growers’ trade associations attempted to develop a
single set of standards, but the resulting “harmonized” standards were not universally
accepted and, in the end, added to the many options available to retailers.82
2. Marketing Agreements and Regulatory Mandates
In 2006, contaminated spinach from the Salinas Valley caused one of the
nation’s most devastating outbreaks, responsible for more than two hundred reported
cases of illness in twenty-six states, one hundred and three victims hospitalized,
thirty-one crippled by kidney failure, and three dead.83 Government advisories
prompted nervous retailers and frightened consumers to avoid all leafy greens.
According to one estimate, California growers suffered nearly $100 million in losses
as a result.84
To reassure retailers and consumers, senior food safety managers at leading
fresh produce processing companies convened a technical committee of stakeholders
from industry, government, and academia to develop detailed food safety standards
for farming leafy greens.85 The result was a marketing agreement among leafy greens
handlers—firms that process or distribute leafy greens—to buy only from farms that
pass periodic food safety audits based on specific “metrics” for water quality, soil
amendments, animal intrusion, worker hygiene, and harvesting equipment
sanitation.86
The founders of the California Leafy Green Product Handler Marketing
Agreement (LGMA) found insufficient scientific literature to justify specific metrics,
so they borrowed relevant criteria from other regulatory areas. Where the LGMA
founders could identify no such relevant metrics, they relied on consensus among
industry representatives or other stakeholders.87 For example, the LGMA founders
could not identify scientific studies that would support quantitative metrics for
preharvest agricultural water quality, so they adopted an established metric used by
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for regulating recreational water
quality.88
In relying on the EPA’s recreational water quality criteria, the LGMA
founders were self-conscious about the incomplete scientific justification for their
new leafy green food safety metrics. David Gombas, a microbiologist who directed
food safety efforts at a leading trade association at the time recalls:
82. See LYTTON, supra note 3, at 127–33 (discussing the rise and proliferation of retail buyer food
safety specifications, independent food safety schemes, branded audits, and harmonization attempts).
83. Michelle Meadows, How the FDA Works to Keep Produce Safe, FDA CONSUMER, Mar.–Apr.
2007, at 12, 13. For a detailed account of the outbreak, see LYTTON, supra note 3, at 118–20.
84. Food Safety: Current Challenges and New Ideas to Safeguard Consumers: Hearing of the Comm.
on Health, Educ., Lab., and Pensions, 109th Cong. 71 (2006) (testimony of Robert Whitaker).
85. LYTTON, supra note 3, at 133–34, 254–55.
86. Id. at 134–38. For the current LGMA metrics, see Food Safety Program, CALIFORNIA LGMA
(2021), https://lgma.ca.gov/food-safety-program. For an introduction to marketing agreements, see G.B.
Wood, Marketing Agreements and Orders—Without Production Controls, INCREASING UNDERSTANDING
OF PUBLIC PROBLEMS AND POLICIES, 1961, at 69, 69–70. For further details on the California Leafy Green
Produce Handler Marketing Agreement, see LYTTON, supra note 3, at 133–41, 176, 253–56.
87. Lytton, supra note 54, at 51–52.
88. TREVOR V. SUSLOW, PRODUCE SAFETY PROJECT ISSUE BRIEF: STANDARDS FOR IRRIGATION AND
FOLIAR CONTACT WATER 6 (2009).
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Everyone was looking around for an answer to the question “What
is water of adequate quality?” and there was no science to come
up with a number. So, the closest thing that they could come up
with was, “Well the EPA is saying that recreational water
standards are safe enough to swim in—and if it’s safe enough to
swim in, it must be safe enough to irrigate with.”. . . . People
wanted numbers, hard numbers. The problem was that there was
no science—no science to support how many, how far, how often.
So, we used the best available science, and, in many regards, we
just simply guessed. If you look at the original leafy greens
metrics, they explain that we are using these numbers as a best
estimation, in the sincere hope that science would provide better
answers in the future.89
Robert Whitaker, who at the time was vice president for food safety at a
major grower and was a principal architect of the LGMA, similarly recalls:
There wasn’t good science in place at the time. So, the measure
that was adopted was basically the recreational water standard the
EPA had put in place. The feeling was, “It’s really no more
scientific than this: that if water is good enough quality to allow
someone to swim in it, then it ought to be good enough quality to
irrigate a crop with.”. . . . In 2006 and 2007, when those metrics
were being developed, that’s what the decision was based on. We
didn’t have data.90
Trevor Suslow, a plant pathologist who worked as a researcher for twentythree years at the University of California-Davis, where he became a leading expert
on the contamination of fresh produce by waterborne pathogens, and who provided
technical advice to the LGMA founders, opined in 2010: “The choice to adopt EPA
recreational-water criteria at the time, and especially in retrospect, did not appear to
be a sound, science-based selection for direct application to irrigation water;
however, in the absence of a publicly available database from extensive testing, it
was deemed the best option.”91
In 2011, President Obama signed the Food Safety Modernization Act
(FSMA), which requires the FDA to “establish science-based minimum standards
for the safe production and harvesting” of fresh produce “related to soil amendments,
hygiene, packaging, temperature controls, animals in the growing area, and water.”92
The FDA published these regulations, referred to collectively as the Produce Safety

89. Telephone interview with David Gombas (June 6, 2016).
90. Telephone interview with Robert Whitaker (June 1, 2016).
91. SUSLOW, supra note 88, at 9; see also JOHN RAVENSCROFT & TREVOR V. SUSLOW, RISK-BASED
APPROACH TO IDENTIFY HAZARDS, PROVIDE CONTEXT FOR MONITORING AND INFORM DECISION
MAKING AND KISS: THE MERITS OF A SIMPLIFIED APPROACH TO AGRICULTURAL WATER TESTING (2018)
(emphasizing that “[t]here is no justification for a strict quantitative standard” for agricultural water);
telephone interview with Trevor Suslow (June 1, 2016).
92. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, § 419(a)(1)(A), (a)(3)(B), 124 Stat.
3885, 3899–90 (2011).
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Rule, in 2015 and began implementing them in 2019.93 The regulations borrow
extensively from the LGMA metrics for leafy greens and apply similar metrics to
fresh produce generally. For example, like the LGMA, the Produce Safety Rule
adopted the EPA’s recreational water quality criteria as the standard for preharvest
agricultural water.94
Industry experts, academic researchers, and government officials are
steadily developing increasing scientific evidence to demonstrate that preharvest
water is a source of pathogenic microbial contamination of fresh produce crops and
that certain practices—such as using ground water instead of surface water, or drip
irrigation rather than flood irrigation—can reduce microbial loads on plants in the
field.95 However, there is still insufficient scientific evidence to support specific
quantitative microbial thresholds or water testing protocols. This assessment is
consistent with the published findings of leading academic, industry, and
government agricultural water quality experts.96
When industry leaders complained about the lack of scientific evidence to
support the FDA’s quantitative water quality metrics, the agency agreed and delayed
implementation until between 2022 and 2024, depending on the size of the farm.97
To be fair, the prospect of financial ruin prompted the LGMA to develop standards
beyond what science could support, and the FDA did the same pursuant to a
legislative deadline.98 The takeaway for the purposes of this Article is that the
specificity of food safety standards in the fresh produce sector relies heavily on
educated guesses by experts unsupported by quantitative data.

93. Standards for the Growing, Harvesting, Packing, and Holding of Produce for Human
Consumption, 80 Fed. Reg. 74,353 (Nov. 27, 2015) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 11, 16, 112); see
generally, FSMA Final Rule on Produce Safety, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION,
https://www.fda.gov/food/food-safety-modernization-act-fsma/fsma-final-rule-produce-safety
[https://perma.cc/L2Y2-4E2X] (last updated Dec. 2, 2021) (detailing compliance dates); Cookson
Beecher, Food-Safety Inspectors Begin Visits to Produce Farms, Packing Houses, FOOD SAFETY NEWS
(Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.foodsafetynews.com/2019/08/food-safety-inspectors-begin-visits-toproduce-farms-packing-houses/ [https://perma.cc/F6VD-638J]; Lytton, supra note 3, at 141–47
(describing history and general overview of the Produce Safety Rule).
94. Standards for Growing, Harvesting, Packing, and Holding of Produce for Human Consumption,
80 Fed. Reg. at 74, 441–42.
95. See, e.g., Draft, Romaine Task Force Dallas, TX, February 13-14, 2019, Meeting
Notes/Summary, PRODUCE MARKETING ASSOCIATION (2019), https://www.pma.com/-/media/pmafiles/food-safety/romaine-task-force-meeting-summaryrecommendations-4119.pdf?la=en
[https://perma.cc/QSY3-LEZD].
96. See, e.g., SUSLOW, supra note 88; Jennifer McEntire & Jim Gorny, Fixing FSMA’s Ag Water
Requirements, FOOD SAFETY MAG. (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.foodsafetymagazine.com/magazinearchive1/augustseptember-2017/fixing-fsmae28099s-ag-water-requirements/ [https://perma.cc/NZ4XHF6D]; Carr, supra note 2, at 9.
97. FDA Finalizes New Compliance Dates for Agricultural Water Requirements, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/food/cfsan-constituent-updates/fda-finalizes-newcompliance-dates-agricultural-water-requirements [https://perma.cc/PLL9-XRVJ].
98. See generally LYTTON, supra note 3, at 118–20, 133–35, 253–56 (discussing pressures on leafy
green producers to develop specific food safety metrics); Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No.
111-353, §105 (a)(1)(A), (b)(1), 124 Stat. 3885, 3899, 3901 (setting statutory deadlines for proposed and
final produce safety rules); LYTTON, supra note 3, at 146 (discussing FDA’s delay in publishing the
produce safety rules and subsequent litigation).
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C. Oversight
As is the case with developing food safety standards, monitoring adherence
to them involves a mix of government and private efforts. Government oversight is
limited by resource constraints. Private oversight is compromised by conflict of
interest. These shortcomings, and the incentive structure of insurance, suggest that
liability and product contamination coverage could, in theory, play a transformative
role in regulatory compliance and standards conformity in the fresh produce sector.
1. Government Inspections
Resource constraints limit the role of government agencies in overseeing
food safety practices on farms that grow fresh produce. The FDA has had jurisdiction
over food safety on farms since passage of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act of 1938, but the agency has never conducted routine inspections of farms.99 The
USDA’s Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) works with state agriculture
departments to provide voluntary food safety audits for fresh produce growers and
handlers on a fee-for-service basis.100 In 2016, the AMS conducted 4224 such audits,
but it is unknown how many of these were farm audits.101 USDA-trained California
Department of Food and Agriculture inspectors conduct an additional 300 California
LGMA compliance audits each year.102 These voluntary, fee-for-service government
inspections cover fewer than 4 percent of the 120,000 U.S. farms that grow fresh
produce intended for retail sale to consumers.103
As part of its efforts to implement the Produce Safety Rule, the FDA has
partnered with the AMS, state agriculture departments, academic institutions, and
industry associations to develop and provide training programs for farmers and state
inspectors.104 The FDA expects that most on-farm government inspections will be
performed by state agencies with financial and technical support from the FDA and

99. Burrows, supra note 66, at 3.
100. Fruits,
Vegetables
&
Specialty
Crop
Audits,
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
https://www.ams.usda.gov/services/auditing/fruits.
101. E-mail from Ken Petersen, Chief Audit Services Branch, Specialty Crops Inspection Div., Agric.
Mktg. Serv., USDA, to author (May 11, 2017).
102. CAL. LEAFY GREENS MKTG. AGREEMENT, ANNUAL REPORT: APRIL 2018–MARCH 2019 1
(2019),
https://lgma-assets.sfo2.digitaloceanspaces.com/downloads/2018.2019-CA-LGMA-Annual-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2C2R-DFS7].
103. Standards for Growing RIA, supra note 10, at 40 (estimating the number of U.S. farms that grow
fresh produce intended for retail sale to consumers).
104. See generally FDA-State Produce Safety Implementation Cooperative Agreement Program, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/federal-state-local-tribal-and-territorial-officials/grantsand-cooperative-agreements/state-produce-implementation-cooperative-agreement-program-cap
(last
updated Jan. 18, 2022) [https://perma.cc/TTQ3-MZ9Y]; FDA and USDA Announce Key Step to Advance
Collaborative Efforts to Streamline Produce Safety Requirements for Farmers, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (Jun. 5, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-and-usda-announcekey-step-advance-collaborative-efforts-streamline-produce-safety-requirements
[https://perma.cc/N3MB-RWSY]; Jennifer Dougherty & Ken Petersen, The Produce Safety Alliance-A
Public/Private
Partnership
for
the
Produce
Industry,
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
https://www.ams.usda.gov/content/produce-safety-alliance-publicprivate-partnership-produce-industry
[https://perma.cc/6UMR-2B5T].
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the AMS.105 Some states reportedly initiated Produce Safety Rule inspections in the
summer of 2019.106 The FDA and state agencies expect to prioritize inspections of
high risk farms, meaning those with a history of food safety problems or that are
especially vulnerable to contamination due to various features of their operations.107
The extent of routine government inspections in the future and their
capacity to ensure compliance remains to be seen.108 Two decades of sustained
criticism of the FDA’s food safety inspection efforts by the Department of Health
and Human Services Inspector General and the Government Accountability Office
suggest that the results of the new program may fall short of the agency’s
aspirations.109 For example, a 2017 review of the FDA’s inspection program for food
production facilities by the Department of Health and Human Services Office of
Inspector General found:
FDA did not always take action when it uncovered significant
inspection violations. . . . When it did take action, it commonly
relied on facilities to voluntarily correct the violations. Also, it
105. Beecher, supra note 93.
106. Id.
107. Id. Examples of features of a growing operation that might lead the FDA or a state agency to
categorize it as high risk include proximity to animal farming operations, the use of organic fertilizers
derived from manure, and watersheds likely to convey contaminated runoff water from areas populated
by domestic or wild animals. See NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE DEP’TS OF AGRIC. FOOD SAFETY
MODERNIZATION ACT TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP, NASDA MODEL PRODUCE SAFETY
IMPLEMENTATION FRAMEWORK 71 (Feb. 22, 2019), https://s3.amazonaws.com/nasda2/media/NASDAModel-Produce-Safety-Implementation-Framework_2-22-2019.pdf?mtime=20190906154302
[https://perma.cc/DPM4-V4FU].
108. See States and FDA Prepare for On-Farm Inspections, THE PACKER (Feb. 22, 2017),
[https://perma.cc/8B8K-R4FB] (quoting leading experts who question the sufficiency of government
resources to conduct routine food safety inspections of produce growing operations).
109. See, e.g., DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., OEI-02-1400420, CHALLENGES REMAIN IN FDA’S INSPECTION OF DOMESTIC FOOD FACILITIES (2017) [hereinafter
CHALLENGES REMAIN]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-183, FOOD SAFETY: ADDITIONAL
ACTIONS NEEDED TO HELP FDA’S FOREIGN OFFICES ENSURE SAFETY OF IMPORTED FOOD (2015); U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-933, FOOD SAFETY: FDA CAN BETTER OVERSEE FOOD
IMPORTS BY ASSESSING AND LEVERAGING OTHER COUNTRIES’ OVERSIGHT RESOURCES (2012); DEP’T
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., OEI-02-09-00430, VULNERABILITIES
IN FDA’S OVERSIGHT OF STATE FOOD FACILITY INSPECTIONS (2011); DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., OEI-02-08-00080, FDA INSPECTIONS OF DOMESTIC FOOD
FACILITIES (2010); DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., OEI-02-0600210, TRACEABILITY IN THE FOOD SUPPLY CHAIN (2009); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO09-873, FOOD SAFETY: AGENCIES NEED TO ADDRESS GAPS IN ENFORCEMENT AND COLLABORATION TO
ENHANCE THE SAFETY OF IMPORTED FOOD (2009); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-08-435T,
FEDERAL OVERSIGHT OF FOOD SAFETY: FDA’S FOOD PROTECTION PLAN PROPOSES POSITIVE FIRST
STEPS, BUT CAPACITY TO CARRY THEM OUT IS CRITICAL (2008); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
GAO-08-1047, FOOD SAFETY: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN FDA OVERSIGHT OF FRESH PRODUCE (2008);
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-08-909T, FEDERAL OVERSIGHT OF FOOD SAFETY: FDA HAS
PROVIDED FEW DETAILS ON THE RESOURCES AND STRATEGIES NEEDED TO IMPLEMENT ITS FOOD
PROTECTION PLAN (2008); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-05-213, OVERSIGHT OF FOOD
SAFETY ACTIVITIES; FEDERAL AGENCIES SHOULD PURSUE OPPORTUNITIES TO REDUCE OVERLAP AND
BETTER LEVERAGE RESOURCES (2005); DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GEN., OEI-01-98-00400, FDA OVERSIGHT OF STATE FOOD FIRM INSPECTIONS: A CALL FOR
GREATER ACCOUNTABILITY (2000).
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rarely took advantage of the new administrative tools provided by
FSMA. Moreover, FDA’s actions were not always timely nor did
they always result in the correction of these violations. FDA
consistently failed to conduct timely followup inspections to
ensure that facilities corrected significant inspection violations.
For almost half of the significant inspection violations, FDA did
not conduct a followup inspection within 1 year; for 17 percent of
the significant inspection violations, FDA did not conduct a
followup inspection of the facility at all.110
Moreover, the FDA’s new produce safety regulations do not apply to farms
with annual produce sales less than $500,000 that market directly to consumers or to
local restaurants, food service operations, or grocery stores.111 According to the
FDA, more than 93 percent of U.S. farms fall below this threshold of $500,000 in
annual sales.112 This leaves consumers who eat locally grown fresh produce largely
unprotected by the federal government’s new produce safety regime.113 A recent
study by the by the University of California-Davis found generic E. coli—an
indicator of fecal contamination—on one third of fresh produce samples sold at
Northern California farmers markets that were certified by local environmental
health agencies to ensure compliance with state health regulations for food
facilities.114
110. CHALLENGES REMAIN, supra note 109, at i.
111. Standards for the Growing, Harvesting, Packing, and Holding of Produce for Human
Consumption, 80 Fed. Reg. at 74,356 (defining local for the purposes of this exemption as “[i]n the same
State or the same Indian reservation as the farm [that produced the food] or not more than 275 miles
away”); see also Standards for the Growing, Harvesting, Packing, and Holding of Produce for Human
Consumption, 21 C.F.R. §§ 112.3, 112.5.
112. Gregory Astill, et. al., Econ. Research Serv., U.S. Dep’t Agric., EIB Bull. No. 194, BEFORE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FOOD SAFETY MODERNIZATION ACT’S PRODUCE RULE: A SURVEY OF U.S.
PRODUCE GROWERS 48 (2018) (stating that, according to the FDA’s Final Regulatory Impact Analysis,
6.8 percent of farms that grow produce have sales of at least $500,000 and, according to the USDA’s
Produce Grower Food Safety Practices Surveys of 2015 and 2016, 29.8 percent of farms that grow fresh
produce have sales of at least $500,000); see also CHRISTINE WHITT, JAMES M. MACDONALD & JESSICA
E. TODD, ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., EIB BULL. NO. 214, AMERICA’S DIVERSE FAMILY
FARMS: 2019 EDITION 3, 21 (2019) (stating that farms with gross cash farm income below $350,000
account for 90 percent of the U.S. farm count and operate almost half of the farmland).
113. Farms with between $25,000 and $500,000 in average annual sales are eligible for a “qualified
exemption,” which imposes recordkeeping and reporting requirements, but not compliance with the
Produce Safety Rule’s standards for water quality, soil amendment, animal intrusion, worker hygiene, and
equipment sanitation. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., STANDARDS FOR PRODUCE SAFETY: COVERAGE AND
EXEMPTIONS/EXCLUSIONS
FOR
21
PART
112
(Nov.
13,
2015),
https://www.fda.gov/media/94332/download [https://perma.cc/6YCY-WZSN]; see Has Our Food
Become Safer in the Last 10 Years?, CIVIL EATS (May 13, 2019), https://civileats.com/2019/05/13/hasour-food-become-safer-in-the-last-10-years/ [https://perma.cc/U523-AVAT] (citing one small-farm
advocate calling for “right-sized regulation, or scale-sensitive regulation”).
114. Dan Flynn, Farmers Market Fresh Produce Often Comes with a Fecal Load Included in Price,
FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Nov. 18, 2020), https://www.foodsafetynews.com/2020/11/farmers-market-freshproduce-often-comes-with-a-fecal-load-included-in-price/ [https://perma.cc/4M7N-MYAG]; see also
Joshua A. Scheinberg et al., A Comprehensive Needs Assessment of Food Safety Practices of Farmers’
Market Vendors in Pennsylvania Using Direct Concealed Observations, Self-Reported Surveys, and State
Sanitarian Surveys, 38 Food Prot. Trends 421 (2018) [https://perma.cc/JFS3-UVRZ] (documenting
shortcomings in food safety among farmers market vendors in Pennsylvania).
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2. Private Audits
Government oversight is not the only, or even the primary, line of defense
protecting consumers from the risk of contaminated produce. Large commercial
buyers of fresh produce—distributors, supermarkets, restaurant chains, and food
service providers—require their suppliers to obtain various sorts of certification of
regulatory compliance and standards conformity from private food safety auditing
firms.115 In 2012, one leading auditor of fresh produce operations conducted 15,000
such audits.116 Although there are no estimates of the number of such auditors
working in the U.S. in the fresh produce sector, by one count, there are 568 accredited
food safety auditing firms operating worldwide.117 A U.S. trade association of food
safety auditing firms claims that nine of its members conduct more than 200,000
audits in 100 countries each year.118 It is safe to say that the reach of private food
safety auditing in the fresh produce sector is far greater than that of government
inspections.
One shortcoming of this reliance on oversight by private auditing firms is
that growers typically pay for their own audits.119 This arrangement creates a conflict
of interest, since auditors seeking to attract or retain accounts may reduce the rigor
of their inspections or inflate audit scores to please a grower.120 The conflict of
interest could be avoided by suppliers relying on their own in-house auditors or
paying independent auditors. Although such arrangements are common in supply

115. For an overview of private food safety auditors, see LYTTON, supra note 3, at 127–30, 251–52.
116. STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 112TH CONG., REP. ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE OUTBREAK OF LISTERIA MONOCYTOGENES IN CANTALOUPE AT JENSEN FARMS 6 (2012) (stating
that leading produce auditing firm Primus Labs “conducts approximately 15,000 audits per year . . . for
over 3,000 clients worldwide”).
117. U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., DOCKET NO. FDA- 2011-N-0143, PRELIMINARY REGULATORY
IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE PROPOSED RULES ON FOREIGN SUPPLIER VERIFICATION PROGRAMS (2011),
139 https://www.fda.gov/media/86371/download [https://perma.cc/FS2F-72PN] (estimating “there are
568 accredited auditors/CBs specializing in food safety audits”); see also Julie A. Caswell, Kathryn A.
Boys, Alyssa A. Danilow & Kathyrn E. Lynch, Food Certification Industry Capacity and Ability to
Comply with FSMA Final Rule on Accredited Third- Party Certification, unpublished paper presented at
the annual meeting of the Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, Chicago 3 (July 30, 2017),
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/258468/files/Abstracts_17_05_24_20_25_18_51__71_192_117_16
_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/YS2K-XPK5] (estimating 581 food safety certification bodies internationally).
118. Food Safety Service Providers, Comments on Proposed Rule for Accreditation of Third- Party
Auditors/Certification Bodies (January 24, 2014), https://www.noticeandcomment.com/FDA-2011-N0146-0031-fcod-344195.aspx [https”//perma.cc/8BAJ-NVJB] (stating that “FSSP members conduct more
than 200,000 audits and inspections in over 100 countries each year”).
119. The analysis below of why fresh produce growers pay for audits draws from Timothy D. Lytton,
Exposing Private Third-Party Food Safety Auditors to Civil Liability for Negligence: Harnessing Private
Law Norms to Regulate Private Governance, 27 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 353 (2019).
120. For a detailed analysis of the conflict of interest in this arrangement, see Lytton & McAllister,
supra note 13; see also LYTTON, supra note 3, at 206–16; Elizabeth Weise, Food Safety Auditors Are
Often
Paid
by
the
Firms
They
Audit,
USA
TODAY
(Oct.
4,
2010),
https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/yourlife/food/safety/2010-10-01foodaudits01_ST_N.htm#uslPageReturn [https://perma.cc/JUP4-GESE]. For empirical evidence of
conflict of interest in third-party environmental audits as a result of auditors being paid by regulated
entities, see Esther Duflo, Michael Greenstone, Robini Pandi & Nicolas Ryan, Truth-Telling by Third
Party Auditors and the Response of Polluting Firms: Experimental Evidence from India, 128 Q.J. ECON.
1499, 1504 (2013).
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chains for processed foods, this is not the norm in the fresh produce sector due to
limited capacity and inefficiency.121 Large commercial buyers of fresh produce
frequently lack sufficient in-house staff to audit their many suppliers.122 A typical
supermarket carries more than 700 fresh produce items, each of which may have as
many as a dozen suppliers.123 Moreover, to ensure consistent availability of fresh
produce throughout the year, some large commercial buyers purchase items in an
auction system, meaning that their suppliers change frequently.124 These buyers do
not know who many of their suppliers are until they purchase items at auction, too
late to inspect the suppliers’ cultivation and harvest practices. Retail supermarkets,
restaurant chains, and cafeteria caterers often buy from distributors, so they lack a
direct relationship with growers.125
Buyers could require growers to pay for government audits, such as AMS
audits, to avoid concerns about the reliability of audits performed by private thirdparty auditors. However, it appears that most large commercial buyers of fresh
produce prefer private auditors to government auditors.126 One reason might be that
private auditors charge less for their services.127 Another explanation might be that
private auditing firms, unlike government auditors, can customize audits to
incorporate the product specifications of any buyer. Private auditors are free to audit
against any standard requested by a buyer. By contrast, government auditors can
audit only against standards that are incorporated into agency regulations or
guidance, or that, at least, undergo a review by multiple layers of agency personnel
to obtain agency approval.128 Buyers’ long-term relationships with specific firms
may also explain their preference for private auditors. When it comes time to select
a list of acceptable auditors for the growers who supply them, buyers may gravitate
to private auditing firms that have previously provided auditing or testing services
for them as part of their efforts to manage food processors in their supply chain. 129
Moreover, not everyone believes that government auditors are more reliable
than private auditors. There is no empirical evidence to support broad generalizations
about the comparative reliability of government auditors and private auditors.
121. Telephone interview with Dave Theno, former founder and owner of Gray Dog Partners, leading
independent food safety consultant (Sept. 5, 2014).
122. Telephone interview with James Prevor, Editor-in-Chief of Produce Business magazine (Aug.13,
2013); Telephone interview with Richard Stier, leading food safety scientist and commentator on food
safety auditing (Aug. 26, 2013).
123. Edward W. McLaughlin, Kristen S. Park & Gerald F. Hawkes, Produce Industry Procurement:
Changing Preferences and Practices, FOOD INDUS. MGMT. PROGRAM, CORNELL UNIV. 7 (Sept. 2015),
http://publications.dyson.cornell.edu/outreach/extensionpdf/2015/Cornell-Dyson-eb1510.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JW36-38NG]; Telephone interview with Prevor, supra note 122; Telephone interview
with John Hansen, former Vice President, Enterprise Risk Management, Sprouts Farmers Market (Mar.
17, 2015).
124. Telephone interview with James Prevor, supra note 122; Telephone interview with Bill Marler,
leading food safety litigator and consumer advocate (Oct. 5, 2014).
125. Telephone interview with James Prevor, supra note 122; Telephone interview with Bill Marler,
supra note 124.
126. Telephone interview with Ken Petersen, Chief Audit Services Branch, Specialty Crops Inspection
Division, USDA-AMS (Sept. 2, 2016).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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Additionally, auditors often come from the same communities as the farmers that
they audit and may be tempted to relax standards because they “want to be liked,”
according to one industry insider, who believes that government auditors are no less
subject to this social pressure than private auditors.130
Under the California LGMA, leafy greens handlers pay for government
audits of growers. To participate in the LGMA, handlers must pay an assessment,
from which the LGMA funds the audits. Participating handlers receive the right to
display the LGMA food safety certification mark on the packaging of their products.
Although a similar marketing agreement was established among Arizona leafy
greens handlers, the LGMA model has not spread to other regions of the country or
other parts of the fresh produce sector.131 Objections to the LGMA model include
concerns about anti-competitive effects, the high cost of coordination required to
establish and maintain a marketing agreement, and the preference of many buyers
for private auditors over government inspectors.132
Evidence that private food safety auditors in the fresh produce sector reduce
the rigor of audits and inflate scores is entirely anecdotal. No data exist to support
even a rough estimate of the extent of the problem. Nevertheless, personal
interviews, professional commentary, and the popular press suggest that financial
conflict of interest compromises the integrity of some audits and undermines public
confidence in private food safety auditing generally.133 At the very least, it is safe to
say that both industry insiders and outside commentators believe it to be a significant
concern that merits attention.
Moreover, private oversight, like government oversight, differs for small
growers who sell their produce locally. Growers who sell directly to consumers need
not satisfy the product specifications of large commercial buyers. Additionally, not
all individual restaurants, small grocery stores, and local food service operations in

130. Telephone interview with James Prevor, Editor-in-Chief of Produce Business magazine (Jan. 28,
2014). For a review of evidence that third-party monitors tend to be more lenient when monitoring firms
with whom they have longstanding relationships, see Jodi Short & Michael Toffel, The Integrity of Private
Third-Party Compliance Monitoring, 42 ADMIN. & REGUL. L. NEWS 22, 23 (2016). For evidence of
political and social pressure on government inspectors specifically in restaurant and food service
inspection, see Daniel Ho, Fudging the Nudge: Information Disclosure and Restaurant Grading, 122
YALE L.J. 595 (2012); Daniel Ho, Does Peer Review Work? An Experiment of Experimentalism, 69 STAN.
L. REV. 1, 93–94 n.407 (2017).
131. ARIZONA LEAFY GREENS MARKETING AGREEMENT, https://www.arizonaleafygreens.org/
[https://perma.cc/WA9U-A9JU]; LYTTON, supra note 3, at 138–41 (discussing the unsuccessful attempt
following establishment of the California LGMA to create a national marketing agreement for leafy
greens).
132. ARIZONA LEAFY GREENS MARKETING AGREEMENT, https://www.arizonaleafygreens.org/ (last
visited Mar. 17, 2022); LYTTON, supra note 3, at 138–41 (discussing the unsuccessful attempt following
establishment of the California LGMA to create a national marketing agreement for leafy greens).
133. See, e.g., Telephone interview with Richard Stier, supra note 122; Friederike Albersmeier, Holger
Schulze, Gabriele Jahn & Achim Spiller, The Reliability of Third-Party Certification in the Food Chain:
From Checklists to Risk-Oriented Auditing, 20 FOOD CONTROL 927 (2009); D.A. Powell, S. Erdozain, C.
Dodd, R. Costa, K. Morley & B.J. Chapman, Audits and Inspections Are Never Enough: A Critique to
Enhance Food Safety, 30 FOOD CONTROL 686 (2013); Editorial: Food Safety Auditors Too Tied to
Industry, USA TODAY (Dec. 24, 2012), https://perma.cc/E3NL-SWYR.
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area schools and hospitals require food safety audits of their suppliers.134 A 2019
USDA report found that smaller growers are less likely than larger operations to
obtain audits that would require them to make costly food safety investments in their
growing operations. The report found that fewer than 40 percent of farmers with less
than $500,000 in annual produce sales obtained audits, and fewer than 20 percent of
farmers with less than $250,000 in sales obtained audits. For the smallest farms,
those with less than $25,000 in sales, the percentage drops to fewer than 5 percent.135
3. Insurance Coverage
Aside from government regulation and industry supply chain management,
liability exposure provides an additional means of encouraging fresh produce
farmers to be mindful of food safety. Here, insurance could play a pivotal role. Fresh
produce growers typically purchase liability insurance to protect themselves against
the potentially ruinous financial consequences of civil liability for foodborne
illness.136 Moreover, large retail stores and restaurant chains typically require their
suppliers to carry liability insurance and to indemnify them for any liability.137 Such
insurance and indemnification requirements are also now common among local
farmers markets, restaurants, and food service operations.138 In addition, there is
growing demand among farmers, especially larger growers, for product

134. Cookson Beecher, Fresh Produce at Farmers Markets Exempt from New Food Safety Regs, FOOD
SAFETY NEWS (Jan. 30, 2013), https://www.foodsafetynews.com/2013/01/fresh-produce-at-farmersmarkets-exempt-from-new-food-safety-regs/ [https://perma.cc/7LPH-3TUA] (noting that many farmers
markets do not require GAPs certification); KRISTEN MARKLEY, FOOD SAFETY AND LIABILITY
INSURANCE: EMERGING ISSUES FOR FARMERS AND INSTITUTIONS 3, 12–13 (Dec. 2010),
http://www.cias.wisc.edu/farmertools14/3-prepare-your-business/food-safety-and-liability-insurance.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YMU8-WWGJ] (finding wide variation in requirements for GAPs conformity among
food service management companies who purchase from small growers); cf. Katherine A. Boys, Linking
Small Fruit and Vegetable Farmers and Institutional Foodservice Operations: Marketing Challenges and
Considerations, 34 RENEWABLE AGRIC. & FOOD SYS. 226 (2019) (asserting that “[h]ospitals, most longterm care facilities and some schools require producers to have GAPs certification”).
135. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECONOMIC INFORMATION BULLETIN, NO. 210, U.S. PRODUCE GROWERS’
DECISIONMAKING UNDER EVOLVING FOOD SAFETY STANDARDS (June 2019) 28–29; see also, Jonan
Pilet, Survey Shows Larger Microgreens Growers Exercise More Food Safety Practices, FOOD SAFETY
NEWS (Feb. 28, 2021), https://www.foodsafetynews.com/2021/02/survey-shows-larger-microgreensgrowers-exercise-more-food-safety-practices/ [https://perma.cc/Y4GP-WCDQ] (reporting that smaller
microgreens growers take fewer food safety precautions than larger growers); CIVIL EATS, supra note
113.
136. Marianne Bonner, Business Insurance for Your Farm, THE BALANCE SMALL BUSINESS (Aug. 7,
2019), https://www.thebalancesmb.com/farm-insurance-4176080 [https://perma.cc/SY63-D84Z].
137. Standard indemnification clauses require suppliers to compensate buyers for any liability that the
buyer incurs arising out of defects in the supplier’s products. For analysis of indemnification clauses in
food supply chain contracts, Bill Marler, Why Grocery Stores Really Don’t Give a Damn about Food
Safety, MARLER CLARK THE FOOD L. FIRM: MARLER BLOG (Mar. 2, 2015),
https://www.marlerblog.com/legal-cases/why-grocery-stores-really-dont-give-a-damn-about-foodsafety/ [https://perma.cc/2Y7E-TN26]; LYTTON, supra note 3, at 247–48.
138. Insurance, Liability, and Regulation, FARMERS MARKET COALITION, archived at
https://perma.cc/E8PZ-ZJBG; Kathryn A. Boys, Food Product Liability Insurance: Implications for the
Marketing of Specialty Crops, 28 CHOICES 1 (2013); Boys, supra note 134, at 6.
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contamination insurance to cover first-party costs associated with recalling tainted
produce.139
Insurance companies that provide liability and recall coverage could, in
theory, take various measures to reduce the risk of potential food safety failures for
which they would be financially responsible. For example, insurers could be
selective in the types and magnitude of risks that they are willing to underwrite,
which would discourage farmers from engaging in high-risk activities that would
disqualify them from insurance coverage—for example, planting crops adjacent to
animal husbandry operations.140 Insurers could offer premium discounts to farmers
who take specified precautions such as adopting irrigation methods less prone to
spreading pathogens. Insurance contracts could include exclusions for high-risk
activities. Insurance carriers could employ loss control experts to identify food safety
concerns and advise farmers on how to reduce risk in their operations.
As a mechanism for food safety oversight in the fresh produce sector,
insurance offers important advantages over government inspections and private
third-party audits. First, unlike government inspections, insurance oversight is not
limited by fixed budgets. For insurers, expanding oversight to cover more farms is
not a financial strain but rather a welcome opportunity to collect additional
premiums, which provide increased resources for inspections and risk management
services. Second, insurers are not susceptible to the conflict of interest that erodes
the reliability of private third-party audits paid for by growers. Like private thirdparty auditors, insurers are paid by growers. However, insurers have a distinctly
powerful incentive to maintain rigorous oversight of farms to reduce the risk of food
safety failures that could give rise to claims for which the insurers would be liable.
Thus, insurance is ideally suited to overcome serious limitations of
government inspections and private third-party auditors. However, significant
information constraints currently hinder the capacity of insurance companies to
provide self-sustaining rigorous oversight of food safety on farms. The next Part
details the nature and sources of these constraints.
III. CHALLENGES TO USING INSURANCE TO REDUCE FOOD SAFETY
RISK
According to economic theory, insurance manages risks by organizing them
into defined categories of losses using claims data and applying actuarial analysis to
price coverage and design cost-effective means to reduce the risk of those losses.141
For reasons described in this section, the estimated 48 million cases of acute
foodborne illness in the U.S. each year generate only a handful of insurance claims.
This presents a significant challenge to insurance underwriting.

139. AON, 2020 EMERGING TRENDS IN PRODUCT RECALL AND CONTAMINATION RISK MANAGEMENT
23
(2020),
https://aon.com/forms/2020/2020-emerging-trends-product-recall.jsp
[https://perma.cc/HDU9-RX8V].
140. Animal husbandry includes the breeding, feeding, and tending of domestic animals, typically for
food production. For other examples of high-risk activities, see discussion supra notes 107–08 and
accompanying text.
141. See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 14; Cogan, supra note 34. See also, Baker, supra note
43 (describing and critiquing this standard economic account of insurance underwriting).
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A. Incomplete Outbreak Investigations
Although food poisoning is very common, identifying the source of
contamination is extremely rare. Most victims of acute gastroenteritis endure the
illness at home without seeking medical care. Of those who do visit a physician, most
are provided with advice and palliative medications but not asked to provide a stool
sample. Only if a victim submits a stool sample can a laboratory identify the
pathogen responsible for that victim’s illness and report it to state public health
authorities. If state public health authorities are equipped and choose to subject the
pathogen to DNA analysis, they will upload the pathogen’s DNA information to a
database maintained by the CDC. When two or more pathogens have identical DNA
fingerprints, the CDC will identify the corresponding illnesses as an outbreak, which
the agency may choose to investigate further, depending upon available resources
and priorities.142
Investigation requires working with state and local health officials to
interview outbreak victims, asking them to recall all the foods that they consumed a
week or more ago, depending on the incubation period of the infection. Even if these
interviews reveal a common food or food ingredient recalled by multiple victims,
investigators cannot identify a company unless at least one victim remembers the
brand of the food, which may be especially difficult in the case of unlabeled fresh
produce. Confirmation of the food vehicle entails testing a sample of the food for the
outbreak pathogen, which requires that victims or the restaurants where they ate still
possess remnants of the food, weeks after it was eaten, which is especially unlikely
in the case of fresh produce.
Determining the root cause of the contamination requires tracing the food
product back through the supply chain and conducting environmental pathogen
testing at each point of potential contamination, including final preparation, sale,
distribution, processing, and growing. In the case of fresh produce, investigators
typically show up on farms weeks or months into an investigation, by which time
growing fields are completely harvested and frequently replanted.
Consequently, of the estimated 48 million episodes of foodborne illness
each year in the U.S., investigators link only one in 12,500 to a single category of
food, and they trace only a fraction of those to a specific product with an identifiable
producer.143 These odds are even lower when the food vehicle is fresh produce,

142. For a more detailed description of foodborne illness surveillance and investigation, summarized
in this and the following two paragraphs, see LYTTON, supra note 3, at 178–200; see also Barbara B.
Kowalcyk, Sara M. Pires, Elaine Scallan, Archana Lamichhane, Arie H. Havelaar, & Brecht
Devleesschauwer, Improving Burden of Disease and Source Attribution Estimates, in FOOD SAFETY
ECONOMICS: INCENTIVES FOR A SAFER FOOD SUPPLY 145–46 (Tanya Roberts ed. 2018); Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, Steps in a Foodborne Illness Outbreak Investigation, (Mar. 18, 2022),
https://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/outbreaks/investigating-outbreaks/investigations/#anchor_1529592062;
Buzby, Frenzen & Rasco, supra note 35, at 3–7.
143. Ctr. for Disease Control, supra note 3. The CDC identified 841 foodborne illness outbreaks
resulting in 14,481 illnesses in the U.S. in 2017. The agency identified a single food category as the source
in 218 (26 percent) of those outbreaks. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
SURVEILLANCE FOR FOODBORNE DISEASE OUTBREAKS, UNITED STATES, 2016, ANNUAL REPORT 2, (Ctr.
For Disease Control, 2019), https://www.cdc.gov/fdoss/pdf/2017_FoodBorneOutbreaks_508.pdf. If one
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which may be sold unpackaged at retail without any brand label or may be bagged
in a mix containing produce from many different growers.144 Moreover, even when
public health officials identify a responsible farm, they typically fail to identify the
root cause of contamination.145
B. Few Claims
The difficulty of attributing episodes of foodborne illness to specific
products makes instances of civil liability rare compared to the prevalence of
foodborne illness.146 Civil liability requires that a victim be able to identify a
company that sold the contaminated food that caused his or her illness.147 Moreover,
not all victims who can identify the source of the food that sickened them file a
lawsuit. Additionally, few victims suffer sufficiently serious harm that would justify
a settlement or jury verdict large enough to finance litigation via a contingency fee
to a plaintiff’s attorney.
Consequently, growing operations generate very few liability insurance
claims arising out of foodborne illness. One agent with nearly thirty years of
experience selling farm insurance could not recall a single claim involving microbial

assumes, for the purposes of estimation, that that these illnesses are equally distributed throughout the
outbreaks, this suggests that approximately 3,754 illnesses are associated with a single food
category/vehicle (14,481 x (218/841)), which is .008 percent of the 48 million annual illnesses, or roughly
1 in 12,500. CDC officials estimate that only about half of reported outbreaks are associated with a source
of contamination. See L.G. Brown, E.R. Hoover, C.A. Selman, E.W. Coleman, & H. Schurz Rogers,
Outbreak Characteristics Associated with Identification of Contributing Factors to Foodborne Illness
Outbreaks, 145 EPIDEMIOLOGY & INFECTION 2254, 2256–57 (2017). Even these associations fall short of
specific identification of root causes. See C. A. Selman, Public Health Measures: Environmental
Assessment in Outbreak Investigation, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FOOD SAFETY 98, 99. John Guzewich, a
retired senior FDA food safety official, estimates that less than 10 percent of all outbreak investigations
identify root causes of contamination. E-mail correspondence from John Guzewich, (May 25, 2020).
Robert Tauxe, the Director of the Division of Foodborne, Waterborne and Environmental Diseases at the
CDC, estimates that the FDA conducts two to four root cause investigations on farms each year. E-mail
correspondence from Robert Tauxe, Dir. of the Div. of Foodborne, Waterborne and Environmental
Diseases, CDC (May 27, 2020).
144. See Brown et al., supra note 143, at 2254 (finding that contributing factors are more often
identified when outbreaks are associated with high-volume food service operations subjected to
environmental testing within a day of an establishment being linked to an outbreak).
145. Even in resource intensive investigations of high-profile outbreaks, conclusions regarding the
source of contamination often remain speculative. See, e.g., LYTTON, supra note 3, at 10 (2011 Jensen
Farms cantaloupe Listeria outbreak), 119 (2006 Dole baby spinach E. coli O157:H7 outbreak), 180–81
(2008 jalapeno pepper Salmonella outbreak).
146. Buzby, Frenzen & Rasco, supra note 35, at 13–14, 24 (counting 178 lawsuits resulting in jury
verdicts between 1988 and 1997); Cogan, supra note 34, at 1538–42; (discussing low food safety litigation
rates); cf. Denis W. Stearns, Contaminated Fresh Produce and Product Liability; A Law-in-Action
Perspective, in MICROBIAL SAFETY OF FRESH PRODUCE 397 n.19 (Xuetong Fan ed., 2009); LYTTON,
supra note 3, at 170 (noting that most foodborne illness lawsuits settle prior to trial and many are settled
before they are even filed).
147. See Denis Stearns, A Critical Appraisal of the Impact of Legal Action on the Creation of
Incentives for Improvements in Food Safety in the United States, in FOOD SAFETY ECONOMICS:
INCENTIVES FOR A SAFER FOOD SUPPLY 370 (Tanya Roberts ed. 2018). On the legal doctrines governing
liability for foodborne illness and litigation dynamics more generally, see, Lytton, supra note 3, at 247–
50.
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contamination of fresh produce.148 A senior farm insurance underwriter with nine
years of experience at a major carrier could also not recall a single claim involving
microbial contamination of food.149 Another senior underwriter with seventeen years
of experience at a second major carrier could recall no claims by small farms and
only a few agribusiness claims.150 The global head of agribusiness for a third major
carrier stated that “we very rarely see that type of claim,” and had to go back fifteen
years to cite an example.151 A senior underwriter at fourth company counted
“something in the neighborhood of eight to ten” such claims in 2019—which hardly
constitutes a basis for robust actuarial data.152 A veteran field underwriter in a major
agricultural state compared the frequency of foodborne illness claims to the chances
of a lightning strike.153
The low rate of claims hinders the capacity of liability insurance to regulate
food safety risk in several ways. To begin with, because lawsuits are extremely rare,
insurance companies are likely to be unconcerned about food safety risk when
offering liability coverage. Additionally, insurance premiums associated with the
very remote risk of being sued are likely to be low, leaving underwriters little room
to offer meaningful discounts capable of incentivizing policyholders to invest more
in food safety precautions. Moreover, low premiums provide insurance companies
with fewer resources to develop food safety expertise that can be applied to
underwriting or contract design, or to provide loss control consulting services for
policyholders. The remote risk of lawsuits also diminishes the incentive that
deductibles and coverage exclusions might otherwise give to policyholders to avoid
activities that increase the risk of contamination. The infrequency of lawsuits
forecloses the common underwriting practice of relying on loss history to evaluate
applications and set premiums.154 And a paucity of claims deprives a company of
data that it can use to refine its underwriting practices, coverage terms, and loss
control advice.155
However, despite the infrequency of claims, liability coverage for food
safety risk is a standard feature of the insurance carried by farms, both large and
small. Losses may be rare, but insurance professionals’ frequent references to
periodic high-profile outbreaks suggest that food safety is a salient risk for
underwriters. Part III surveys the variety of policies that include this coverage. Part

148. Telephone interview with Agent C (Dec. 2019).
149. Telephone interview with Underwriter N (Dec. 2019).
150. Telephone interview by research assistant Lillian Henry with Underwriter H (Feb. 2020).
151. Telephone interview with Underwriter I (Nov. 2019).
152. Telephone interview by research assistant Lillian Henry with Underwriter J (Feb. 2020); see also
Telephone interview by research assistant Lillian Henry with Underwriter C (Apr. 2020) (recalling only
“very few” recall claims in thirty-three years of experience at a leading U.S. farm and agribusiness carrier).
153. Telephone interview with Underwriter A (Nov. 2019).
154. This is not to say that applications for insurance do not ask about an applicant’s claims history or
that underwriters ignore this issue. Rather, the point here is that the rarity of prior claims means that a
“clean” loss history may not be a reliable indicator of the risk of future claims. For an example of an
application that inquires about claims history, see Vendor/Producer Insurance, CAMPBELL RISK
MANAGEMENT, (Mar. 18, 2022), https://www.campbellriskmanagement.com/for-vendors/.
155. This paragraph summarizes a more robust analysis of underdeterrence in food product liability
insurance in, Cogan, supra note 34, at 1543–45.
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IV then describes how insurers manage this risk in response to high-profile
outbreaks.
IV. FOOD SAFETY COVERAGE FOR FRESH PRODUCE GROWERS
Insurance companies sell food product liability coverage and food product
contamination coverage to fresh produce growers in a variety of forms. These types
of coverages may be bundled with other lines of coverage in standard package
policies, added as endorsements to other types of coverage, or sold as free-standing
monoline policies.156 They may be expanded by supplemental excess or umbrella
policies.157 They may be written using standard forms created by the Insurance
Services Office (ISO) or the American Association of Insurance Services (AAIS),
company-specific insurer forms, or customized manuscript forms.158
A. Farm Insurance
Food product liability coverage is typically sold to growers as part of either
farm liability coverage or commercial general liability coverage. Farm liability
insurance covers only losses arising out of farming operations. Farms engaged in
activities beyond the scope of farming require commercial general liability
coverage.159 Commonly used policy language defines farming as follows:
“Farming” means the operation of an agricultural or aquacultural
enterprise, and includes the operation of roadside stands, on your
farm premises, maintained solely for the sale of farm products
produced principally by you. Unless specifically indicated in the
Declarations, “farming” does not include:
a. Retail activity other than that described above; or

156. ISO Farm Liability Insurance Products, INTERNATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE (2020),
https://www.irmi.com/online/agribusiness/farm-liability/coverage-forms/iso-farm-liability-insuranceproducts.aspx;
Other
ISO
Farm
Liability
Options
(2020),
https://www.irmi.com/online/prmi/ch015/1l15q000/al15q50-other-iso-farm-liability-options.aspx.
A
monoline policy covers only one type of risk. Monoline Policy, INSURANCEOPEDIA (2021),
https://www.insuranceopedia.com/definition/2957/monoline-policy.
157. Farm Umbrella Liability, INTERNATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE (2020),
https://www.irmi.com/online/agribusiness/farm-overview/umbrella-liability.aspx. Umbrella policies may
offer coverage for additional risks and higher coverage limits. Excess policies merely offer higher
coverage limits for risks already covered by the underlying policy. Ashley Arikawa, Umbrella vs. Excess
Liability
Insurance
Policies,
J.
MOREY
CO.,
INC.
(May
23,
2013),
https://www.jmoreyins.com/2013/05/23/umbrella_vs_excess_liability_insurance_policies/
[https://perma.cc/DR9D-XYHG].
158. Policy Forms Used, INTERNATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE (2020),
https://www.irmi.com/online/agribusiness/farm-property/operations/policy-forms-used.aspx.
159. Farm Liability Underwriting Considerations, INTERNATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE
(2020),
https://www.irmi.com/online/agribusiness/farm-overview/exposures/underwritingconsiderations.aspx; RMI Farm Liability Underwriting Considerations; Neil Hamilton, Chapter Ten:
Insurance and Liability, THE LEGAL GUIDE FOR DIRECT FARM MARKETING (1999),
https://web.archive.org/web/20150520021151/http://directmarketersforum.org/the-legal-guide-fordirect-farm-marketing/ [https://perma.cc/2WLR-Y957].
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b. Mechanized processing operations.160
According to this definition, farming would not include selling farm
products at an offsite farmers market or cutting and packaging mixed greens.161
These would be considered commercial activities beyond the scope of farming.
Farm policy language varies, as does interpretation of common terms. One
longtime underwriter explained that the key distinction between farming and
commercial activity was whether the produce in question was “unaltered” or
“altered” when the farmer sold it.162 Another experienced underwriter emphasized
the distinction between selling products “wholesale” versus “retail.”163 A third
contrasted processing one’s own produce with processing produce grown by
others.164 Some policies would allow coverage for selling at farmers markets but not
for selling online.165 For others, sales of more than $500 no longer qualify as
farming.166
Insurance companies typically sell farm liability coverage as part of a farm
insurance package, which includes some combination of coverage for a farm
dwelling, household personal property, farm machinery and equipment, farm
structures, and farm products and supplies, and may also include personal or
commercial auto coverage.167 The liability insurance component covers liability
arising out of conditions on the premises and farming operations, farm products and
completed operations, contractual agreements to assume the liability of others, and
injuries caused by independent contractors doing work for the farm.168 Liability for

160. Farm Liability Coverage Form, FL 00 20, INTERNATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE
(2015), https://www.irmi.com/online/prmi/ch015/1l15q000/al15q40-iso-farm-liability-insurance.aspx.
The term “declarations” refers to the front page or pages of an insurance policy that specifies key
information specific to the insured, including policy limits. Declarations, INTERNATIONAL RISK
MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE (2021), https://www.irmi.com/term/insurance-definitions/declarations.
161. Other examples offered by interview subjects included preserving jam, baking pies, pressing
apple cider, making wine, canning vegetables, or extracting olive oil. See Telephone interview with
Underwriter A, supra note 153 (jam); Telephone interview by research assistant Lillian Henry with Agent
B (Oct. 2019) (jam, apple cider, vegetables); Telephone interview with Agent C, supra note 148 (jam,
wine, oil); Telephone interview with Underwriter N, supra note 149 (jam, pies).
162. Telephone interview with Underwriter A, supra note 153.
163. Telephone interview with Product Developer A (Sept. 2019).
164. Telephone interview with Underwriter N, supra note 149.
165. Telephone Interview with Underwriter N, supra note 149.
166. See Telephone Interview with Agent C, supra note 148; see also Farming Defined,
INTERNATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE, https://www.irmi.com/online/agribusiness/farmoverview/exposures/farming-defined.aspx; Farm Liability Underwriting Considerations, supra note 159;
Farm
Insurance,
INTERNATIONAL
RISK
MANAGEMENT
INSTITUTE,
https://www.irmi.com/online/agribusiness/farm-overview/basics/farminsurance.aspx#jd_what_is_a_farm.
167. Farm Insurance, supra note 166; Bonner, supra note 136.
168. General Liability Exposures, INTERNATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE,
https://www.irmi.com/online/cli/ch004/1l04c000/al04c010.aspx; Farm Premises and Operations Risks,
INTERNATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE, https://www.irmi.com/online/agribusiness/farmliability/farm-premises-operations-risks.aspx.
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foodborne illness from eating contaminated products sold by the farmer falls within
the category of farm products and completed operations.169
Farm insurance packages are designed for farm owners who live and work
on their farms.170 Insurance companies justify farm liability coverage limits
excluding processing and offsite sales as a means of ensuring that farm insurance is
affordable. As one underwriter put it, “farm liability is relatively inexpensive to
purchase, so the degree of exposure it is willing to entertain cannot be very robust,
otherwise the price would have to go considerably higher.”171 Another underwriter
explained, “[G]enerally, we have found that when you begin altering your product,
you begin marketing to a wider base. Your exposure is greater because you can
package your strawberry jam and ship it anywhere around the state.”172
B. Commercial General Liability Coverage
For farmers whose operations extend beyond farming, insurance companies
offer commercial general liability (CGL) coverage, which extends to liability arising
out of processing, packing, storage, sales, and distribution, and which is,
consequently, more expensive than farm liability coverage.173 Some companies sell
CGL as part of a business operators package, designed for small businesses, which
includes commercial property and other business-related coverages, or as a
standalone policy.174 Others include CGL as part of a farm insurance package.175
Alternatively, companies sometimes sell farmers freestanding CGL policies and add
personal property and liability coverages as endorsements.176 A few companies sell

169. Farm Products and Completed Operations Risk, INTERNATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT
INSTITUTE,
https://www.irmi.com/online/agribusiness/farm-liability/farm-premises-operationsrisks.aspx; see Telephone Interview with Underwriter A, supra note 153; Telephone Interview with
Product Developer A, supra note 163; Telephone Interview with Agent B, supra note 161; Telephone
Interview with Agent C, supra note 148; Telephone Interview with Underwriter I, supra note 151.
170. Bonner, Business Insurance, supra note 136; Farmowners Insurance, INTERNATIONAL RISK
MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE, https://www.irmi.com/term/insurance-definitions/farmowners-insurance.
Small farm operations with minimal farming operations on a small amount of acreage, a dwelling, a
limited number of outbuildings, little machinery, personal private passenger vehicles or small truck, and
a farmer whose primary source of income is other than farming—often referred to as “hobby” or
“gentleman’s” farms or “ranchettes”—are typically covered under homeowners policies. Farm Insurance,
supra note 166.
171. Telephone Interview with Product Developer A, supra note 163.
172. Telephone Interview with Underwriter A, supra note 153.
173. Farm Insurance, supra note 166.
174. Marianne Bonner, What is a Business Owners Policy?, THE BALANCE SMALL BUSINESS (Nov.
19,
2020),
https://www.thebalancesmb.com/what-is-a-business-owners-policy-4158586
[https://perma.cc/9XJX-RD3W]; Telephone Interview by research assistant Zachary Trippe with Agent
D (Feb. 2020); Telephone Interview with Consultant A (Oct. 2019).
175. Farm Insurance, supra note 166; AAIS Farmowners Program, INTERNATIONAL RISK
MANAGEMENT
INSTITUTE,
https://www.irmi.com/online/prmi/ch015/1l15q000/al15q60-aaisfarmowners-program.aspx; Telephone Interview with Consultant B (Sept. 2019). CGL could be added to
a farm insurance package as a standard module or an endorsement. Telephone Interview with Underwriter
F (Oct. 2019).
176. Endorsements to the CGL Policy, INTERNATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE,
https://www.irmi.com/online/agribusiness/farm-liability/endorsements/to-the-cgl-policy.aspx;
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farmers market insurance, which bundles general liability and products and
completed operations liability coverage for farmers who sell their goods at farmers
markets.177 Insurance companies can broaden the scope of both farm liability
coverage and CGL via endorsements, excess policies, and umbrella policies that
expand products and completed operations coverage.178
C. Product Contamination Policies
Product contamination insurance is not a standard component of either farm
or commercial insurance.179 Some insurance companies sell limited coverage for the
costs of recalling a contaminated product as an endorsement to farm or commercial
liability policies.180 Although some carriers offer recall endorsements, most small
and medium size farmers balk at the extra price,181 which one underwriting manager
estimated would double a typical small farmer’s premium,182 and another suggested
could increase a small farmer’s premium by as much as 800 percent.183 For larger
operations, some insurance companies offer more robust coverage that is tailored to
the needs of the policyholder.184 In addition to covering the costs of removing a
product from store shelves and destroying it, these policies may also cover associated
business losses when clients reduce or cancel purchases, as well as the costs of
restoring a policyholder’s sales or rehabilitating its brand.185 Currently, more than
thirty carriers sell such coverage to food and beverage companies with policy limits
Telephone Interview with Consultant B, supra note 175. An endorsement is an amendment to an insurance
policy that either changes or adds to terms of the policy. Endorsement, INTERNATIONAL RISK
MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE, https://www.irmi.com/term/insurance-definitions/endorsement; Farm
Liability
Endorsements,
INTERNATIONAL
RISK
MANAGEMENT
INSTITUTE,
https://www.irmi.com/online/agribusiness/farm-liability/endorsements.aspx.
177. See, e.g., Farmers Market Insurance for Food Vendors, FOOD LIABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM,
https://www.fliprogram.com/farmers-market-insurance [https://perma.cc/Z225-P6T4]; FMC and
Campbell Risk Management Make Farmers Market Insurance Available to Producers Nationwide,
FARMERS
MARKET
COALITION,
https://farmersmarketcoalition.org/crm_insurance/
[https://perma.cc/FGU8-E42J].
178. See Marianne Bonner, Products-Completed Operations Coverage, THE BALANCE SMALL
BUSINESS (July 30, 2018), https://www.thebalancesmb.com/products-completed-operations-coverage462588 [https://perma.cc/V9Y7-S7HV]; Telephone interview with Underwriter F, supra note 175;
Telephone interview with Underwriter L (Oct. 2019); Telephone interview with Agent B, supra note 161.
179. See Telephone Interview with Underwriter A, supra note 153; Telephone Interview with
Underwriter G; Telephone Interview with Underwriter J, supra note 152; Telephone Interview by research
assistant Lillian Henry with Underwriter B (Feb. 2020); Telephone Interview with Loss Control Specialist
B (Apr. 2015). For a discussion on explicit exclusion of recall costs and liabilities in ISO Farm Insurance,
see Farm Liability Coverage Exclusions, INTERNATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE,
https://www.irmi.com/online/agribusiness/farm-liability/exclusions.aspx.
180. Telephone Interview with Product Developer A, supra note 163; Telephone interview with
Underwriter N, supra note 149.
181. Telephone Interview with Agent A (Nov. 2019); Telephone Interview with Broker B (Sept.
2019); Telephone interview with Underwriter H (Feb. 2020); Telephone interview with Underwriter G,
supra note 179.
182. E-mail from Underwriting Manager J (Dec. 21, 2020) (on file with author).
183. E-mail from Underwriter H (Dec. 22, 2020) (on file with author).
184. Telephone Interview with Underwriter I, supra note 151; see E-mail from Underwriter J (Dec.
21, 2020) (on file with author); Telephone Interview with Underwriter H, supra note 150.
185. LYTTON, supra note 3, at 148–49.
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as high at $150 million.186 Approximately one third of these policies cover fresh
produce growers or processors.187 The next Part details how insurers incorporate risk
management into farm, CGL, and product contamination policies.
V. FACTORING FOOD SAFETY INTO UNDERWRITING FRESH
PRODUCE FARMING
Accounts of insurance as regulation specify several means by which
insurance carriers attempt to reduce the risk of losses. These include risk selection,
premium pricing, contract terms, loss prevention, and public education.188 A closer
look at underwriting practices reveals how some insurance carriers employ these
strategies to encourage compliance with food safety standards on fresh produce
farms.
A. Bureaucratic Structure
Underwriting is a collaborative process. Agents or brokers typically initiate
the underwriting process by collecting information from applicants for insurance.189
Additionally, carriers may authorize agents to enter into an insurance contract on
behalf of the carrier with a farmer, a practice known as “binding” coverage. As one
underwriting manager explained:
[Our agents are] the first point of contact, and they serve as our
frontline underwriters. They have the ability and training to
evaluate risk. . . . They are familiar with our underwriting guides.
And even though they are not underwriters, they are charged with
evaluating whether [a risk is] something we would be interested in
insuring and whether we can help a particular individual out. . . .
Most of our agents have the ability to bind a farm policy without
home office underwriting approval, so long as it meets our
guidelines. So, a lot of times, they can just go ahead and write a
farm policy if it meets the underwriting guidelines. If it needs to
go commercial or if it’s a more complicated type of farm or if there
are other considerations that come up, the agent would then call
186. Steves, supra note 49, at 11–13, 17–18.
187. E-mail from Bernhard Steves (Jan. 11, 2021) (on file with author).
188. See, e.g., Baker & Swedloff, supra note 23; Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 14.
189. Telephone Interview with Underwriter A, supra note 153; Telephone Interview with Agent C,
supra note 148. Agents represent insurance companies and have authority to “bind business”—that is,
enter into an insurance contract on behalf of the insurance company or companies that they represent. A
“captive” agent represents only one company. An “independent” agent may represent multiple companies.
Brokers represent consumers and “place business”—that is, connect their clients with insurance
companies offering suitable coverage. Brokers are not attached to an insurance company or companies.
Brokers cannot bind business; they merely direct their clients to insurance agents or directly to companies,
with whom the clients can enter into insurance contracts. Agents and brokers typically earn commissions
on the policies that they bind or place. Some captive agents may be salaried employees of the insurance
companies that they represent. Insurance Agents and Brokers, Insureon (2020)
https://www.insureon.com/insurance-glossary/insurance-agent-broker
[https://perma.cc/R5KZ-F78J];
Marianne Bonner, How Insurance Agents and Brokers Make Money, THE BALANCE SMALL BUSINESS
(September 9, 2019), https://www.thebalancesmb.com/agents-versus-brokers-and-how-they-makemoney-462383 [https://perma.cc/FHJ9-FM9J].

318

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 52

the home office underwriter or field underwriter, and we would
dig into it a little bit deeper.190
Interviews with agents and underwriting managers indicate variation among
carriers as to how commonly they authorize agents to bind farm and commercial
coverage without approval by an underwriter.191 Carriers are more willing to
authorize agents to independently bind coverage for smaller and more routine
risks.192 The underwriter quoted above explained that agents bind roughly 70 percent
of his company’s farm insurance but very little of its commercial insurance unless
the agent has earned special authority as a “master underwriter agent.”193 Another
underwriter indicated that his company requires agents to submit all insurance
applications for approval by an underwriter.194 One agent reported that an insurance
carrier for whom he sold an inexpensive policy with relatively low coverage limits
outsourced to him the entire underwriting process.195
Agents and brokers learn more about farm risks and coverage options as
they gain experience. For example, “in California’s Central Valley area, there are a
number of brokers and agents who are known to specialize within the farm
community,” explained a longtime senior claims executive.196 Typically, a broker or
agent “will gather information on the risk . . . so that they can look for carrier
matches and make recommendations about the types of coverages,” said another
senior claims executive. The brokers and agents “are familiar with the food industry,
so they know what the issues are within the industry.”197
Underwriters are insurance company employees who assess the magnitude
of risks for which an applicant seeks coverage to determine whether it would be
profitable for the carrier to issue an insurance policy and, if so, how much to charge

190. Telephone Interview with Underwriter A, supra note 153. Other interview subjects provided
similar descriptions of the role of agents in underwriting. Telephone Interview with Product Developer
A, supra note 163 (“The agents are . . . the eyes on the ground, so to speak. They are the ones that work
with the customer to evaluate the scale of their operations, the extent of the exposures on the farm and
evaluate what those coverage needs are.”); Telephone Interview with Underwriter I, supra note 151
(“[W]e consider them our first-level underwriters who will see the risk before they submit [an application]
to us and then they can tell the underwriter about it and about what’s on the location or what’s at the
location.”); Telephone Interview with Underwriter H, supra note 181 (“[The] agent is . . . our frontline
person.”); Telephone Interview with Underwriter J, supra note 152 (“We would let the agents do some . . .
[of what] we call upfront underwriting.”); Telephone Interview by research assistant Lillian Henry with
Broker D (Sept. 2019) (“[The] agents and brokers are considered [the] field underwriters.”); Telephone
Interview by research assistant Lillian Henry with Underwriter K (Apr. 2020) (“The agent is our up-front
underwriter. The agent is expected to visit the risk and gain information and photos. The information is
then submitted to underwriting for review.”).
191. See Telephone Interview with Product Developer A, supra note 163; Telephone Interview with
Agent B, supra note 161; Telephone Interview with Underwriter J, supra note 152; Telephone Interview
with Agent E (Sept. 25, 2019).
192. See Telephone Interview with Underwriter A, supra note 153; Telephone Interview with Agent
E.
193. Telephone Interview with Underwriter A, supra note 153.
194. Telephone Interview with Product Developer A, supra note 163.
195. Telephone Interview with Agent E, supra note 192.
196. Telephone Interview with Claims Manager A (Apr. 2015).
197. Telephone Interview with Underwriter F (May 2015).
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in premiums.198 Underwriters review applications for insurance from agents and
brokers, and they quote premiums for those applications that they approve.199
Underwriting authority is hierarchical, meaning that underwriters’ risk assessments
are typically subjected to “a quality assurance review that takes place at the next
level of underwriting, just to make sure that we have carefully evaluated . . . the
liability potential. . . . “ explained a risk management expert at one carrier.200 Some
carriers employ field underwriters, who go out of the office to gather information
directly from applicants through interviews and onsite inspections.201
Loss control specialists, claims adjusters, and product managers also play a
role in the underwriting process. Loss control specialists are typically inhouse risk
management experts who provide advice to underwriters and policyholders about
how to reduce exposure.202 “We have food underwriters who specialize and focus
just on food,” explained a loss control specialist at a leading farm and agribusiness
carrier.203 “That’s all that they underwrite. Their specialty is food. And to go hand in
hand with that . . . we have a couple of food specialists on our risk management team
as well. It’s a great partnership between underwriting and risk management.”204
Underwriters occasionally rely on outside consultants for loss control advice.205
Claims adjusters investigate claimed losses by policyholders, determine the
amount owed, and negotiate payments. Claims experience informs underwriting.
Referring to a 2006 outbreak traced back to Dole baby spinach contaminated with E.
coli O157:H7, a senior claims manager explained:
Our underwriters were able to learn immensely from the Dole case
through our claims people, and the legal, medical, and scientific
experts that the claims people work with in litigation. You can’t
duplicate that; you can’t buy it elsewhere. . . . The underwriter
learns from a claim why the loss occurred and . . . how best to
avoid it in the future. . . . You can apply model data all you want,
but without the unique insights you get from real world experience,

198. LYTTON, supra note 3, at 149.
199. See id.
200. Telephone Interview with Loss Control Specialist B, supra note 179.
201. Telephone Interview with Underwriter A, supra note 153; see Telephone Interview with Product
Developer A, supra note 163; Telephone Interview with Agent B, supra note 161; Telephone Interview
with Underwriter H, supra note 181; Telephone Interview with Underwriter I, supra note 151, Telephone
Interview with Consultant B, supra note 175. For an elaboration of the types of information that
underwriters gather, see infra Part V.C.
202. Loss
Control
Specialist,
CAREER
CONNECTIONS
(2016),
https://www.careerconnections.info/en/Post-Secondary-Students/Career-Profiles/Loss-Control-Specialist
[https://perma.cc/E5LN-UM36].
203. Telephone Interview with Underwriter M.
204. Telephone interview with Underwriter M, supra note 203. Other interview subjects similarly
reported that loss control specialists advise underwriters. See also Telephone Interview with Underwriter
F, supra note 197; Telephone Interview with Underwriter L (Oct. 2019).
205. Telephone Interview with Underwriter H, supra note 150; Telephone Interview with Underwriter
B, supra note 179; Telephone Interview with Underwriter J, supra note 152; Telephone Interview with
Underwriter L, supra note 178.
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that’s only part of the equation, and you are probably missing some
very unique aspects of underwriting a risk.206
One senior underwriter reported that underwriters evaluating a particular
risk frequently consult with claims managers who have had experience with that
risk.207
Product managers develop, monitor, and revise the various coverages,
referred to as insurance “products,” that carriers sell.208 Product managers
collaborate with underwriting managers to craft underwriting guidelines, which
standardize the types of information that underwriters should collect and how they
should weigh different risk factors. “We typically work together to set up the
underwriting guidelines,” reported a product manager at a major farm and
agribusiness carrier. She explained that product management serves as a
clearinghouse for feedback and learning within the company:
We are kind of like the nucleus that works with all the different
departments, and then we take all that knowledge and feedback
and turn it into something that can be incorporated into the
underwriting process. Whatever we have learned from prior claims
or whatever we have learned from trends in the industry—working
with claims and working with our loss-control group—we will
turn that into an underwriting guide or a training that we can then
provide to our underwriting groups, so that they have this
knowledge in the future as they’re assessing risks.209
B. Information Gathering Methods
The information about applicants necessary for farm and agribusiness
underwriting comes from a variety of sources. Typically, agents and brokers
interview applicants by phone or in person.210 Applicants sometimes submit written
responses on standardized questionnaires.211
Agents, brokers, and underwriters may seek to verify this information or
obtain additional information by consulting online sources. Agents and underwriters
reported looking up applicants’ websites and social media postings.212 One
underwriter added that he uses Google Earth to verify relevant geographical
information.213 Underwriters also consult regulatory agency websites for recalls of

206. Telephone Interview with Claims Manager A, supra note 196.
207. Telephone Interview with Product Developer A, supra note 163.
208. See Terri Hitchcock, Why Partner with an Insurance Produce Design Specialist?, PERR &
KNIGHT (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.perrknight.com/2016/12/21/partner-insurance-product-designspecialist/ [https://perma.cc/E4EH-NDBE].
209. Telephone Interview with Underwriter I, supra note 151.
210. See Telephone Interview with Underwriter M, supra note 203; Telephone Interview with Agent
C, supra note 148; Telephone Interview with Consultant B, supra note 175.
211. Telephone Interview with Agent E, supra note 192; Telephone Interview with Product Developer
A, supra note 163; see, e.g., Vendor/Producer Insurance, supra note 154.
212. Telephone Interview with Agent B, supra note 161; Telephone Interview with Underwriter M,
supra note 203; Telephone Interview with Underwriter N, supra note 149.
213. Telephone Interview with Underwriter J, supra note 152.
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applicants’ products, warning letters, or enforcement actions against applicants.214
As one underwriter explained:
Whenever we are underwriting a risk that is producing something
that we would consider susceptible [to contamination], or it’s a
larger farm that is producing a good volume of fruits or vegetables,
we will always check the CDC and any other product-recall
sources to make sure that individual operation has not had any
outbreaks. And if they have: What are the details and the reasons
behind that? What have they changed since then to prevent
something like that from happening again?215
Another underwriter said that he occasionally consulted online restaurant
reviews by customers and employees to search for outbreaks that might be associated
with foods grown by applicants.216
Farm inspections are not a source of underwriting information for most
smaller policies. According to several agents and underwriters, underwriting small
farm policies does not typically include a visit to the farm.217 One agent explained
that when the applicant is a small farm doing less than $50,000 in sales, he does not
do an inspection.218 An underwriting manager at a large carrier reported that her
company would not do a farm inspection for an agribusiness policy if the premiums
were less than $25,000.219 Moreover, when agents do conduct an inspection for farm
insurance, they typically focus on the value of farm buildings and equipment for the
purposes of evaluating property coverage, with little or no attention to food safety.220
By contrast, bigger farms with processing operations, larger production
volumes, or high-risk crops undergo inspections with an eye toward food safety
risks.221 “For a guy who’s just growing strawberries and sends them to a co-op or to
a jam manufacturer—there would be no inspection done on a farm like that,”
explained one senior underwriter. However,
if the farmer is creating a product, they are turning those berries
into jam, then likely we would do an inspection. We would
potentially make sure that they are following standard food safety
214. Telephone Interview with Underwriter I, supra note 151; Telephone Interview with Underwriter
L, supra note 178.
215. Telephone Interview with Underwriter I, supra note 151.
216. Telephone Interview with Underwriter N, supra note 149.
217. Telephone Interview with Agent E, supra note 192; Telephone Interview with Underwriter I,
supra note 151; Telephone Interview with Underwriter F, supra note 197; Telephone Interview with
Product Developer A, supra note 163; Telephone Interview with Underwriter B, supra note 179;
Telephone Interview with Agent A, supra note 181.
218. Telephone Interview with Agent A, supra note 181.
219. Telephone Interview with Underwriter F, supra note 197.
220. Telephone Interview with Underwriter A, supra note 153; Telephone Interview with Underwriter
H, supra note 150.
221. As part of its FSMA regulations, the FDA designates certain foods as posing a high risk of
microbial contamination. These foods include leafy greens, sprouts, tomatoes, peppers, melons, tropical
tree fruits, herbs, and all fresh-cut vegetables and fruits. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Food Traceability
List (Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/food/food-safety-modernization-act-fsma/food-traceability-list
[https://perma.cc/BK8S-APSB].
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practices in terms of their manufacturing of whatever the product
is that they are making. So, we would have a loss prevention
inspector go out and inspect the facilities.222
Another senior underwriter reported that:
We have our loss-control team that will go visit our higher
premium farms, larger farms, or anything that is doing any type of
complex operation. . . . Oftentimes, an underwriter will go with
them. I would say our agents have typically visited the majority of
the farms that they do business with, you know, with the exception
of some of the very tiny, very basic farms that we write. Anything
medium size or anything that is doing any type of more complex
operation, our agents have generally been on the premise.223
A senior underwriter at a third carrier reported that:
typically, most of the underwriting process is just done via photos
that are sent in, loss runs, Googling the address, looking at
websites, and looking at Facebook. Somebody, where there is
more of a food safety concern, is looking at Yelp, employee
reviews. And then if we do have concerns in terms of leafy greens
or a higher exposure, we will sometimes send an inspector out
there to take a look at it.224
Thus, underwriters vary in the level of scrutiny that they use in assessing
farm risks. For smaller, simpler, lower-risk operations, with relatively low-premium
policies, underwriters rely primarily on written applications, personal interviews, and
internet searches—activities that can be accomplished without leaving the office. For
larger, more complex, higher-risk enterprises, with higher premium policies,
underwriters also employ on-farm inspections.
C. Underwriting Criteria
Underwriters vary also in the sources and depth of their knowledge about
food safety risks associated with fresh produce farming. Some underwriters know
very little about food safety and employ crude proxies for risk, such as farm size, on
the theory that more sales mean more risk.225 At the other end of the spectrum, other
underwriters study government regulations, industry standards, and academic
research to discern the relative risk associated with different farming practices.226 In
between are underwriters who depend on media coverage of outbreaks to classify

222. Telephone Interview with Underwriter B, supra note 179.
223. Telephone Interview with Underwriter I, supra note 151; see also Telephone Interview with
Underwriter M, supra note 203 (“We do some pre-quote, risk-management inspections. So, before we
even are willing to release the quote for a lot of this, we would want our risk managers on site to make
sure that they feel that it is an insurable risk for us.”).
224. Telephone Interview with Underwriter N, supra note 149.
225. See infra, notes 229–32 and accompanying text.
226. See infra, notes 250–56 and accompanying text.
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some types of produce or operations as high-risk.227 Underwriters also rely on their
general impressions and instincts about how carefully farming operations are
conducted.228 All this variation means that underwriting criteria will differ among
insurers.
One common underwriting criterion is farm size—measured by sales
revenue or acreage under cultivation—which underwriters use to estimate liability
exposure and to price premiums.229 “Sales are a really big factor in the underwriting
process for a raw product,” explained one underwriter.230 “The odds that [a farmer]
might have a problem would increase with the more sales he has. The fewer sales he
has, the less risk we see in the marketplace.”231 Another underwriter reported that for
“farm liability, we rate . . . on acreage.”232
Some underwriting guidelines consider the relative contamination risk of
different types of crops. One underwriting manager explained that his company asks:
“What is the product? Is it something that is more susceptible to disease or
bacteria?”233 A second senior underwriter stated, “we look at levels of risk by food
type. For example, leafy greens are definitely a higher risk than a jar of peanut
butter.”234 According to a third underwriter, “Pricing is going to vary based on the
type of product being sold. If it’s leafy greens, which definitely have a track record
of Salmonella, it’s going to be more expensive. . . . That’s driven by the hazard risk
of the product being sold.”235 Underwriting guidelines sometimes set a threshold for
high-risk crops. “We look at the proportions of exposure,” explained one
underwriting manager. “For leafy greens, is that 5 percent of the operation or 95
percent?”236 One company’s underwriting guidelines specify that underwriters
should decline coverage of farms growing multiple crops if leafy greens are more
than fifteen percent of their total acreage.237

227. See infra, notes 244–46 and accompanying text.
228. See infra, notes 257–62 and accompanying text.
229. Telephone Interview with Underwriter B, supra note 179; see also Telephone Interview with
Consultant B, supra note 175; Telephone Interview with Agent E, supra note 192; Telephone Interview
with Product Developer A, supra note 163; Telephone Interview with Underwriter N, supra note 149;
Telephone Interview with Agent B, supra note 161; see, e.g., Vendor/Producer Insurance, supra note 154
(insurance application that asks applicants about estimated gross sales); FMC and Campbell Risk
Management, supra note 177 (structuring farmers market insurance coverage based on gross sales).
230. Telephone Interview with Underwriter J, supra note 152.
231. Telephone Interview with Underwriter B, supra note 179; see also Telephone Interview with
Agent A, supra note 181; Telephone Interview with Agent E, supra note 192; Telephone Interview with
Broker B, supra note 181; Telephone Interview with Product Developer A, supra note 163; Telephone
Interview with Agent C, supra note 148.
232. Telephone Interview with Underwriter N, supra note 149.
233. Telephone Interview with Product Developer A, supra note 163.
234. Telephone Interview with Underwriter M, supra note 203.
235. Telephone Interview with Underwriter B, supra note 179; Telephone Interview with Underwriter
C, supra note 152 (“The higher hazard the product, the higher the price for liability coverage and the less
limits are available. A common example of a high hazard product is leafy greens.”).
236. Telephone Interview with Product Developer A, supra note 163.
237. Anonymous Underwriting Guidelines (Jan. 30, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author). These guidelines are considered proprietary information and were shared with the author on the
condition that the identity of the company to which they belong is not disclosed.
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Underwriters characterized crops grown outdoors on the ground and
typically consumed raw as high risk. “We are very cautious around leafy greens,
broccoli, spinach—any type of vegetable or green that we know generally will grow
on the ground,” explained one senior underwriter.
They have closer contact with bacteria and water that may have
bacteria in it, but the other issue is that they are generally eaten
raw. . . . The likelihood of an outbreak illness is lessened if it is
something that is generally eaten after being fully cooked. Those
are the thought processes we go through as we are determining
what we consider higher exposure in an agriculture product.238
Another underwriter similarly reported, “if you’re growing vegetables that
are almost always cooked before they are eaten, that would be a low-risk type of
produce, because when you cook the food, you are going to cook out most of the
pathogens that might be in it.” By contrast, “if the type of food you’re growing is
mostly eaten raw—lettuces and a lot of other leafy greens—then that’s going to be
higher risk. . . . “239
Some underwriters focus on water quality. “We are finding that irrigation
methods are a good underwriting tool to find out whether or not a risk is acceptable,”
explained one senior underwriter, “We have a chart, and we look at things like . . .
Are they irrigated? If they are irrigated, how are they irrigated? Are they using
sprinklers? Are they using drip irrigation? Are they using flood irrigation? All of
those things will impact an underwriter’s decision whether to write the farmer’s
policy or what kind of price they might give.”240
Underwriters also evaluate risk based on the proximity of a farming
operation to sources of contamination, like concentrated animal feeding
operations.241 “The underwriters don’t always know if there is a large cattle or

238. Telephone Interview with Underwriter I, supra note 151.
239. Telephone Interview with Underwriter B, supra note 179; see also Telephone Interview with
Underwriter L, supra note 178 (stating presence of a “kill step,” such as cooking, relevant to distinguishing
low from high-risk foods).
240. Telephone Interview with Underwriter J, supra note 152; see Draft Romaine Task Force Meeting
Summary, supra note 95 (suggesting that the use of ground water instead of surface water or drip irrigation
rather than flood irrigation can reduce microbial loads on plants in the field); Tay Fatke, Benefits of
Utilizing Drip Irrigation for Food Safety, CAROLINA FARM STEWARDSHIP ASS’N (Dec. 22, 2020),
https://www.carolinafarmstewards.org/benefits-of-utilizing-drip-irrigation-for-food-safety-best-practice/
[https://perma.cc/F6CJ-7755] (explaining that irrigation methods such as drip irrigation that do not
involve irrigation water contacting the edible portion of the plant reduce the risk of microbial
contamination); see also, Suslow, Standards for Irrigation, supra note 88, at 3–4 (discussing water quality
implications for different irrigation methods); Commodity Specific Food Safety Guidelines for the
Production and Harvest of Lettuce and Leafy Greens, CALIFORNIA LGMA (Aug. 20, 2020),
https://lgmatech.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/CA-LGMA-Metrics-August-2020_Final_Clean_918-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/TC2D-98PP] (detailing the most recent LGMA metrics for preharvest
agricultural water and distinguishing between different methods of delivery).
241. Draft Romaine Task Force Meeting Summary, supra note 95 at 3 (discussing the risk of
agricultural water contamination from neighboring animal feedlots); see also, Bill Marler, Captain
Obvious: Nearby Cow Shit Can Cause E. coli Outbreaks in Leafy Greens, MARLER BLOG (May 21, 2020),
https://www.marlerblog.com/lawyer-oped/captain-obvious-nearby-cow-shit-can-cause-e-coli-outbreaksin-leafy-greens/ [https://perma.cc/D82P-2EK4].
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livestock farm near the vegetable grower,” elaborated one senior underwriter, “but
that is one thing that our loss control reps should be looking at when they go out.”242
Another factor mentioned was the likely consumers’ vulnerability to foodborne
illness, citing, for example, the elderly or infants.243
Media coverage of outbreaks informed underwriters’ classification of
certain types of crops as high-risk. As examples of high-risk crops, they frequently
cited leafy greens, sprouts, melons, and tomatoes—all of which have been associated
with high-profile outbreaks. One underwriting manager explained, “we avoid the
products that are known to be most susceptible . . . the ones that have the outbreaks
more often that we hear about in the media and we see though our different
sources.”244 This underwriting manager also described how she and her colleagues
have news feeds that cover food safety issues.245 Others mentioned that they also
obtained information from trade associations and university extension services.246
In addition to farm size and crop type, underwriters investigate whether an
applicant has ever recalled a product or been sued for a food safety failure.247
Underwriters typically ask the applicant directly and also examine the applicant’s
website, and search public records for this information.248 Although recalls are rare
and lawsuits are even rarer, some underwriting guidelines include them as a basis for
declining coverage.249
Underwriters also look at regulatory compliance and standards conformity.
According to a senior claims manager at one company, underwriting large
agribusiness clients involves “surveying the actual operation to determine how well
they comply with the various industry, proprietary, and state safety controls.”250 For
any type of processing, according to one senior underwriter, applicants “would need
to have a commercial grade kitchen according to their local codes with regard to food

242. Telephone Interview with Underwriter B, supra note 179; Telephone Interview with Underwriter
J, supra note 152 (“If there are feedlots or cattle operations nearby, that would be something that we look
at.”).
243. Telephone Interview with Underwriter M, supra note 203 (elderly); Telephone Interview with
Agent E, supra note 191 (baby food).
244. Telephone Interview with Underwriter I, supra note 151.
245. Telephone Interview with Underwriter I, supra note 151.
246. See Telephone Interview with Product Developer A, supra note 163; Telephone Interview with
Agent A, supra note 181.
247. See Telephone Interview with Agent B, supra note 161; Telephone Interview with Broker B,
supra note 181; Telephone Interview with Agent C, supra note 148; Telephone Interview with Agent D,
supra note 174; Telephone Interview with Underwriter I, supra note 151; Telephone Interview with
Underwriter B, supra note 179; Telephone Interview with Underwriter M, supra note 203; Telephone
Interview with Underwriter N, supra note 149; Telephone Interview with Underwriter E; Telephone
Interview with Underwriter C, supra note 152; Telephone Interview with Loss Control Specialist B, supra
note 179.
248. Telephone Interview with Underwriter L, supra note 178; Telephone Interview with Underwriter
M, supra note 203.
249. Anonymous Underwriting Guidelines, supra note 237.
250. Telephone Interview with Claims Manager A, supra note 196; see also Telephone Interview with
Underwriter M, supra note 203 (“We want to make sure they abide by rules and regulations set forth
through either FSMA, the FDA or HACCP.”); see, e.g., Vendor/Producer Insurance, supra note 154
(insurance application that asks applicants about regulatory compliance).
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preparation and sales” as verified by local inspectors.251 “If it is a larger operation,
then we send a loss prevention inspector out to take a look, [and] they will have a list
of things that they are looking for. We have a form that they fill out about food
safety.”252 The form is a checklist which includes technical scrutiny of the applicant’s
food safety risk management program.253 Underwriters may also review an
applicant’s private food safety audits.254
For smaller operations, underwriters may rely on proxies for regulatory
compliance and standards conformity. “We don’t have a checklist,” explained a
senior underwriter who works with small farms. Underwriters rely instead on farmers
membership in state commodity marketing programs that require demonstrated
compliance with government regulations and industry standards. The same senior
underwriter elaborated:
You can look at, for example, the Virginia Grown or the Georgia
Grown programs. That stuff does a lot of the underwriting because
they hold their producers accountable as a condition of being in
the program. . . . Pennsylvania has one called Pennsylvania
Preferred, and Maryland has one called Maryland’s Best. . . . It is
a good indication, a kind of intangible. It is not a make-or-break
type thing, but it is always nice to see. You are putting in the extra
effort to try to brand your product. I don’t know if there’s really a
correlation [with food safety risk], like having a HACCP program
or SQF [Safe Quality Food] certification, but it helps.255
Along these lines, underwriters also consider how long the applicant has
been in business. In some cases, for small farms or processors, companies require
applicants to self-certify compliance with all relevant government regulations, and
compliance is incorporated into the policy as a condition of coverage.256
Finally, underwriters rely on their general impressions and instincts. This is
especially true for smaller farms. One senior underwriter described the underwriting
process in the following terms:
It is not formalized. We utilize field underwriters. Our field
underwriters tend to be long tenured, more experienced
underwriters. They are out there in the field, meeting with folks,
and we have developed confidence in them to be able to do that
and assess risk. There is no real checklist per se—that we have to
see A, B, and C in place to ensure a specific food safety risk. They
will go out and meet with the farmer. They will talk with him
again. “How long have you been doing this?” “What’s your

251. Telephone Interview with Underwriter B, supra note 179.
252. Telephone Interview with Underwriter B, supra note 179.
253. The form includes sanitation and HACCP measures. Anonymous Underwriting Guidelines, supra
note 237.
254. Telephone Interview with Claims Manager A, supra note 196.
255. Telephone Interview with Underwriter H, supra note 150; see also Telephone Interview with
Consultant B, supra note 175.
256. Telephone Interview with Agent E, supra note 191; see, e.g., Vendor/Producer Insurance, supra
note 154.
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experience with a specific endeavor?” They check out the
cleanliness of the operation. “Do you have safety guides?” “Do
you have training?” “Do you have employees?” “Are your
employees experienced with this?” “How big of an operation is
it?” “How big is your marketing web?” “Do you advertise on the
Internet?”. . . . It is less formal, but our field underwriters, who are
trained, really know the questions to ask and the questions to
follow up on, once an insured communicates with us what he or
she is doing. . . . Our target market is small to medium-sized
family type farms, and not the really the high production, largescale farms.257
A second senior underwriter also emphasized the importance of the
“experience level of management and employees.”258 Several underwriters
mentioned general hygiene and sanitation.259 As one agent explained:
“Housekeeping of the premises says a lot, usually, about the quality of the risk. And
it is probably one of the easiest things to look at. . . . You are going to look at the
facilities. Are the facilities clean?”260 “It’s kind of subjective,” summed up another
senior underwriter.
When I go out, it is more of just a relationship-type thing, and I
ask them, “What’s going on?” and “Tell me about your business.”
You learn a little bit about the way they manage their business,
their pride of ownership, what they are doing differently from
other people in the same industry. And, more or less, you just kind
of get a gauge on their attitudes and their approach to managing
their farm or other commercial agribusiness. You know, once you
get that information, a lot of these other things fall into place.261
This type of generalized assessment also takes place in recall coverage for
large producers. As a senior underwriter explained:
We want specifics about their quality control—the steps they are
taking for traceability . . . their quality control manual and their
product recall plan. . . . We are trying to figure out exactly how
thorough they have been in terms of developing quality control. If
we get a recall plan that is one-page long and it looks like it came
off the FDA recommended plan, we know right off the bat that
these guys have not put a lot of effort into it. If we get a two-page
quality control manual, we are, like, “Okay, but there’s a lot
missing here.”262

257. Telephone Interview with Underwriter A, supra note 153.
258. Telephone Interview with Product Developer A, supra note 163; see also Telephone Interview
with Underwriter A, supra note 153 (“What’s their experience? Are they just starting up this operation or
have they been involved in it for thirty years?”).
259. Telephone Interview with Underwriter M, supra note 203; Telephone Interview with Underwriter
B, supra note 179.
260. Telephone Interview with Agent B, supra note 161.
261. Telephone Interview with Underwriter H, supra note 181.
262. Telephone Interview with Underwriter G, supra note 179.
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Because of the infrequency of claims, as described in Part III, underwriters
in the farm and agribusiness sectors lack the loss history necessary to develop
actuarial data regarding food safety risk. As the interviews quoted in this Part
suggest, they rely instead on rules of thumb such as gross sales and acreage limits,
news reports and public records about high-profile outbreaks, compliance records
and private certifications, and personal impressions and intuitions about the quality
of farmers’ risk management. As the recall underwriter quoted above explained,
“[w]e don’t have the benefit of years and years of liability losses. . . . Recall does not
have that kind of predictive modelling yet, so it has a lot to do with . . . experience
in the marketplace, people who have been doing it for a while. . . . “263 When asked
about the maturity of underwriting practices in the field compared to more developed
types of insurance such as fire and auto, she replied, “somewhere between newborn
and adolescent.”264
For even prominent insurance providers in the farm and agribusiness
sectors, attention to food safety risks in farming operations is an emerging aspect of
underwriting. “It’s something I think has gone under the radar for a really, really
long time,” admitted one senior underwriter with twenty years of experience.
If you look at the fact that, even on farm liability, we rate only
based on acreage, that tells you a lot. If it’s ten acres of corn, it’s
going to be treated the same as ten acres of leafy greens—even if
that’s just feeder corn versus leafy greens that are going to land on
your table. So that alone tells me that in the past, there has not been
much concern for food safety. A lot of the losses we tend to see
are going to be commodity losses in terms of hay fire, potato
spoilage—an insured hauling potatoes and flips a truck or
something like that. Those are typically where a lot of our losses
come from. But I think we are getting into a situation here we are
seeing more and more food safety concerns.265
Although most underwriters reported that they rely on more than merely a
single crude proxy for food safety risk like acreage, they shared the view expressed
here that food safety is a newly emerging concern.266 This growing attention to food
safety risks has begun to express itself in efforts to reduce those risks.
D. Risk Reduction Techniques
Farm and agribusiness carriers employ a variety of techniques to reduce the
risk of food safety failures in fresh produce operations.

263. Telephone Interview with Underwriter G, supra note 179; see also Telephone Interview with
Underwriter E, supra note 247 (expressing a similar view).
264. Telephone Interview with Underwriter G, supra note 179.
265. Telephone Interview with Underwriter N, supra note 149.
266. Telephone Interview with Underwriter G, supra note 179; Telephone Interview with Underwriter
E, supra note 247; Telephone Interview with Consultant A, supra note 174; Telephone Interview with
Agent F (Mar. 2020).
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1. Risk Selection and Premium Pricing
Insurance carriers use risk selection and premium pricing as leverage to
encourage farms to improve their food safety efforts. “We avoid the products that
are known to be most susceptible and that have outbreaks more often that we hear
about in the media, and we see through our different sources,” reported a senior
underwriter at a major carrier.267 “So, we do not write many leafy green farms. We
do not write many melon farms. In general, we will avoid those unless we see
something that we truly consider best in class that has their safety management top
notch.”268
To incentivize farms to meet this high standard, she explained, “the
underwriter does have a little bit of discretionary authority to influence pricing up or
down based on specific risks. . . . First of all, we want to see the appropriate safety
measures in place, to even consider entertaining the business, and then that would
further play into [premium] credits or debits.” For example:
if we like the risk, but we definitely see some opportunity where
they need to improve some of their safety measures or make some
changes around their water sourcing, that’s probably something
we’re going to apply pricing debits on until they make those
changes and then we would remove them to make the premium
more attractive. And then vice versa, if we have a risk that we have
decided to write and they have excellent safety measures in place,
we may issue a credit on the policy to reflect that mitigation of
risk.269
A senior underwriter at another major carrier similarly explained that
a risk may be ineligible because it doesn’t risk manage well, or
they’re not willing to put some of the procedures in place that we
would require. Or you may have some that are willing to do it; they
just don’t have it in place now. That would be something we would
take into account when we are pricing the account.270
Risk selection and premium pricing are ongoing. According to a loss control
specialist at a leading carrier, his office periodically sends risk management experts
to review clients’ operations.
After a policy is issued . . . if the risk management consultant goes
out and identifies that there is risky behavior going on . . . he will
make recommendations . . . to reduce that exposure and then

267. Telephone Interview with Underwriter I, supra note 151.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Telephone Interview with Underwriter M, supra note 203; see also Telephone Interview with
Agent F (Mar. 2020) (“[P]art of the process of the private insurance industry now . . . they don’t just say
‘okay, you got it.’ They come out, look over your farm and take pictures and say you’re going to be highrisk because of this and this or this, and so your premium is going to be that. But if you clean these things
up, then we can give you a reduced premium. And that’s the way it is done. And so, they try to decrease
the risk of what they’re insuring.”).
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report back to the underwriter about whether those
recommendations were followed. If the client does not follow the
recommendations, that may affect their premium upon renewal or
their actual renewal.271
Agents also play a role in leveraging risk selection to encourage farmers to
reduce food safety risk. One agent explained how she counsels farmers to conduct
their business in ways that fit the risk appetite of insurance carriers.
I tell my farmers, “Come talk to me while you are in the incubation
stage to make sure your idea is insurable.” . . . The prudent thing
is training the farmer to understand the parameters of the insurance
industry, rather than just saying that they cannot get the
insurance. . . . “Let’s start with where the insurance industry is and
meet them where they are at.” That’s good business relations.272
A senior underwriter explained how agents and brokers perform a gatekeeping
function using risk selection. “The underwriters work with our agents and brokers to
communicate what our appetite is, and then they are out there trying to find risks that
would fit our appetite, and those are the ones they submit to our underwriters to
review and assess the exposure and the risk.”273
2. Contract Terms
In addition to risk selection and premium pricing, farm and agribusiness
carriers use contract terms—for example, coverage exclusions and deductibles—as
incentives for policyholders to reduce the risk of losses.274 According to one claims
executive, some policies include warranty terms, under which a claim is covered
only if the company meets the terms of the warranty. For example, “you [the produce
company] warrant that you are getting third-party inspections on a quarterly basis
and, if you are not, then there is either no coverage or reduced coverage.”275 Some
policies also include exclusions for high-risk products, such as raw milk, but this is
rare for fresh produce.276 Coverage terms also sometimes include deductibles, which
encourage policyholders to reduce the risk of losses.277
The use of contract terms to reduce food safety risk is not universal. Many
agents, brokers, underwriters, loss control specialists, claims adjusters, and product
managers interviewed for this study reported that farm and commercial liability

271. Telephone Interview with Loss Control Specialist A (May 2015).
272. Telephone Interview by research assistant Lillian Henry with Broker D (Sept. 2019).
273. Telephone Interview with Underwriter I, supra note 151.
274. Baker & Swedloff, supra note 23, at 1420; Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 14, at 208.
275. Telephone Interview with Claims Manager A, supra note 196.
276. Telephone Interview with Agent E, supra note 192; Telephone Interview with Claims Manager
B (Aug. 27, 2013).
277. Telephone Interview with Loss Control Specialist B, supra note 179.
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policies do not generally contain exclusions related to food safety.278 They also said
that deductibles are very rare in such coverage, especially for small farms.279
3. Loss Control
Insurers provide loss control advice to farmers to reduce the risk of food
safety failures. “Any time our field underwriters are meeting with somebody . . . and
they see areas where we can help . . . improve safety, we encourage them to do so,”
explained one senior underwriter.280
It is not just a process of “I am going to go out there to see whether
this is something we want to insure or not.” We have had a lot of
conversations with folks where we say, “This is not something that
we can take home at this point, but if you’re willing to work with
us some and correct A, B, and C, give us a call back. This is how
we can put you in a better position even outside of an insurance
conversation. We can help put you in a better position to protect
yourself from a liability claim.”281
Two other senior underwriters who work together described how loss
control experts provide “coaching” to farmers. According to one, “There are
opportunities where we can step in and say, ‘Maybe you can separate that peanut
butter and lettuce production. And then you would lower your potential risk.’”282 The
second added,
Our risk management team comes out with recommendations.
Some are insurability recommendations, meaning they have to fix
that, or they are not a risk we want to write. Some are just a niceto-have type of thing or are just there to help them. Basically, we
want to just help them, because it obviously helps us not have
losses but also helps them be the best that they can be in their
business.283
Loss control advice is more common for policies that have high premiums.
“We set aside a portion of the premium that our clients pay us for what we call ‘risk

278. See Telephone Interview with Underwriter A, supra note 153; Telephone Interview with Product
Developer A, supra note 163; Telephone Interview with Agent B, supra note 161; Telephone Interview
with Broker B, supra note 181; Telephone Interview with Underwriter I, supra note 151; Telephone
Interview with Underwriter J, supra note 190; Telephone Interview with Consultant B, supra note 175;
Telephone Interview with Agent E, supra note 192; Telephone Interview with Underwriter N, supra note
149; Telephone Interview with Underwriter C, supra note 152.
279. See Telephone Interview with Product Developer A, supra note 163; Telephone Interview with
Agent B, supra note 161; Telephone Interview with Underwriter J, supra note 190; Telephone Interview
with Consultant B, supra note 175; Telephone Interview with Agent E, supra note 192; Telephone
Interview with Loss Control Specialist B, supra note 179; see, e.g., Coverage Details, FOOD LIABILITY
INSURANCE
PROGRAM
(Apr.
19,
2021),
https://www.fliprogram.com/coverage_details
[https://perma.cc/6ALM-JY3R].
280. Telephone Interview with Underwriter A, supra note 153.
281. Telephone Interview with Underwriter A, supra note 153.
282. Telephone Interview with Underwriter M, supra note 203.
283. Id.
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engineering work,’” explained a senior underwriter of product contamination
coverage. This process involves hiring an outside consultant to “audit overall food
safety systems, looking for gaps or areas of improvement, and then spending the
money that we’ve set aside working with [the client] to focus on the gaps.”284 An
independent loss control consultant reported:
I do work for insurance companies evaluating food safety risks of
different companies that are applying for a product contamination
policy. I am asked to go in and evaluate their food safety measures.
And then, based upon that, [the insurer] may provide them
incentives in reducing the risk by implementing some programs.
The insurance company in that fashion is looking at reducing some
of those risks in various operations.285
One underwriter at a product contamination carrier explained that her company
dedicates 10 percent of premiums to “pre-incident” loss control services, which can
cost tens of thousands of dollars per year.286
Smaller premium policies do not generally support much loss control
advice. As an independent underwriting consultant explained about coverage priced
for smaller operations: “The premium here is not going to drive enough interest for
us to do a whole lot of services on the carrier side of things. So, it is more template
underwritten. . . . “287 An agent similarly commented that: “If you are big enough or
you are doing the kind of thing that needs you to have general liability in addition to
the farm liability, then those are the people who are getting those services. The 40
acres of peaches—probably not.”288 These comments indicate that the smaller the
farm, the more standardized the underwriting process and the fewer the risk services
that accompany coverage.289
4. Public Education
Insurance agents and carriers provide public education to highlight the
importance of compliance with food safety regulations and standards. Some agents
post blogs or speak on panels aimed at educating farmers about the risk of
contamination, liability exposure, the importance of regulatory compliance, and the

284. Telephone Interview with Underwriter E, supra note 247.
285. Telephone interview with Consultant C (Jan. 21, 2015).
286. Telephone interview with Underwriter G, supra note 179.
287. Telephone interview with Consultant B, supra note 175.
288. Telephone interview with Agent A, supra note 181. A similar observation was made by others.
See also Telephone interview with Agent C, supra note 148; Telephone interview with Agent E, supra
note 191; Telephone interview with Underwriter C, supra note 152.
289. Telephone interview with Data Analyst A (June 5, 2019).
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need for adequate coverage.290 Farmers Union, affiliated with leading farm insurance
carrier Farmers Union Insurance, offers trainings to farmers in FSMA compliance.291
VI. MANAGING UNCERTAINTY
Food safety regulation is characterized by a high degree of uncertainty. The
inability of public health officials to identify the root causes of outbreaks associated
with fresh produce has left experts in government, industry, and academia unable to
evaluate the impact of current food safety standards on human health outcomes.292
The infrequency of claims and the lack of robust actuarial data means that insurance
underwriters are no better equipped to verify the efficacy or efficiency of current
food safety standards in reducing foodborne illness. Insurance carriers merely rely
on the professional judgments of experts outside the insurance industry who
themselves lack scientific evidence to justify many aspects of the food safety
measures they prescribe.293
Although insurance underwriting does not advance knowledge about the
efficacy and efficiency of current food safety standards, it does play a role in
encouraging farmers to implement them. The interviews presented in this Article
illustrate how insurance companies determine eligibility, set premiums, structure
coverage, give loss prevention advice, and provide public education with the aim of
reducing the risk of contamination that could give rise to foodborne illness claims.
The underwriting criteria that support these risk reduction efforts include compliance
with government regulations and conformity to industry guidelines. Thus, insurance
underwriting practices incentivize adherence to current food safety standards.
A. The Impact of Insurance on Food Safety
This analysis prompts at least two important questions about the
contribution of insurance to food safety. How big a role does insurance play in food
safety compliance? What is the value of compliance given uncertainty about the
effectiveness and efficiency of current food safety standards?
290. See, e.g., Producer Liability: Understanding & Communicating Vendors’ Risks & Insurance
Needs,
FARMERS
MKT.
COAL.
(2011),
https://farmersmarketcoalition.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/10/Vendor_Insurance_Webinar_2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z794-KEBT]; Reuben
Dourte, Small Farm Product Liability: Coverage for Your Farm Products, SMALL FARM QUARTERLY
(July 14, 2017), https://smallfarms.cornell.edu/2017/07/small-farm-product-liability-coverage-for-yourfarm-products/.
291. NFUF to Aid Local Produce Growers and Processors with FSMA Compliance, NATIONAL
FARMERS UNION FOUNDATION (Aug. 24, 2016), https://pafarmersunion.org/2016/08/24/nfuf-fsmacompliance/ [https://perma.cc/2HPV-2HNM].
292. See supra Part I.B. for a detailed analysis of how little is known about the efficacy and efficiency
of food safety efforts in the fresh produce sector; see LYTTON, supra note 3, at 163–77, 232–34, 240–41.
For an explanation of why root cause analysis is so difficult, see supra notes 133–36 and accompanying
text.
293. See supra Part I.B; see, e.g., Suslow, Standards for Irrigation, supra note 88 (describing the
speculation underlying quantitative metrics for agricultural water quality standards); Suslow, Risk-based
Approach, supra note 91 (emphasizing that “there is no justification for a strict quantitative standard” for
agricultural water); Carr, supra note 2, at 9 (concluding that “we lack a scientifically-validated measure
of what concentration of bacteria in water it takes to contaminate produce and, in turn, how that
corresponds to consumer risk.”).
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1. The Role of Insurance
Three dozen interviews do not constitute robust evidence that insurance
plays a significant role in regulating food safety risk in the fresh produce sector.
However, these interviews do open the black box of underwriting practices to reveal
how insurance professionals help farmers manage food safety risk. The interviews
indicate broad variation in the resources available to carefully select risks and price
premiums, design coverage terms with food safety risk in mind, provide loss control
inspections and counseling, and educate policyholders. Coverage with lower
premiums priced to make it affordable for small farmers typically involves formulaic
and cursory underwriting decisions. Although such policies may include some
incentives to reduce risk—such as self-certification of regulatory compliance—the
business model for them is low overhead, high volume, and limited client services.
By contrast, the higher premiums of more robust coverage, especially customized
recall insurance, typically fund more intensive underwriting efforts and sophisticated
loss control services by professional food safety consultants.
Some forms of insurance underwriting focus merely on reducing clients’
exposure to litigation without attempting to prevent the harms that give rise to legal
claims.294 This does not appear to be the case for food safety coverage. The picture
that emerges from this study suggests that food product liability insurance and
product contamination insurance aim to reduce the risk of microbial contamination
and prevent foodborne illness.
There are reasons to suspect that this role for insurance will grow in the
future. Advances in outbreak investigation and more frequent root cause analysis
will likely, over time, increase the liability exposure of farms and boost demand for
more robust liability and recall insurance.295 Moreover, expanding liability exposure
among commercial buyers of fresh produce—distributors, retail stores, restaurants,
food service providers, and farmers markets—is likely to increase the prevalence of
requirements that growers have sufficient coverage to absorb potential liability,
recall products, and indemnify buyers.296 Educational and sales efforts by agents,
294. See Talesh, Insurance Companies, supra note 27 (contrasting employment practices liability
insurance—”bad” insurance as regulation aimed merely at reducing exposure to litigation—to cyber
insurance—”good” insurance as regulation aimed at reducing the risk of data breaches).
295. For an analysis of advances in outbreak investigation, see LYTTON supra note 3, at 186–89
(detailing improvements in pathogen typing and foodborne illness surveillance), 225–27 (discussing
improvements in traceability); see Feds Plan to Begin Testing Research Program with Romaine Lettuce
in Ariz., FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Feb. 5, 2021), https://www.foodsafetynews.com/2021/02/feds-plan-tobegin-testing-research-program-with-romaine-lettuce-in-arizona/ ) (reporting new FDA initiative for
testing and tracing of leafy greens); Bryan Hitchcock, What We Learned from the Traceability Pilots,
FOOD SAFETY MAGAZINE (Jan. 26, 2021), https://www.food-safety.com/articles/6938-what-we-learnedfrom-the-traceability-pilots (describing a 2020 multi-stakeholder project to improve traceability); A Guide
for Conducting A Food Safety Root Cause Analysis, Pew Charitable Trust (Mar. 24, 2020),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/reports/2020/03/a-guide-for-conducting-a-foodsafety-root-cause-analysis (analyzing the implications of improved root cause analysis); see also Carr,
supra note 2, at 12 (noting recent increases in federal funding for outbreak surveillance and investigation)
and Industry Leaders Expand Produce Safety Research, FOOD SAFETY MAGAZINE (Jan. 20, 2021),
https://www.food-safety.com/articles/6935-industry-leaders-expand-produce-safety-research (reporting
recent trade association investments in food safety research).
296. On insurance requirements imposed by buyers on fresh produce growers, see Boys Linking supra
note 134, and Boys Food Product, supra note 138.
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brokers, and carriers may also increase the willingness of some farmers to pay for
more expensive policies and the risk management services that they include. As one
veteran underwriter of product contamination insurance explained:
[I]t takes two or three years to sell a policy to a new buyer. The
first year, they will look at it and go, “Holy [cow]! How much do
you want for this? No way. I’m walking away.” And then the
second year, they’re like, “You know what? I think we really need
this, but I just don’t have the money in the budget.” And the third
year, they come by and they’re like, “We want to buy. We’ve
budgeted for it.” And that is how we sell. . . . It’s a long-term
[pipe]line. And those that are successful are the ones that are
building those [pipe]lines.297
However, higher premiums for commercial liability coverage and more
robust recall policies are likely to remain a significant barrier for many small
farmers.298 One solution might be organizing small farmers into risk pools capable
of generating sufficient premiums to support risk management services that could
take advantage of economies of scale. Group insurance along these lines might be
organized through trade associations or marketing agreements.299 Another option
might be providing government subsidies for food-safety-related coverage, along the
model of federal crop insurance.300
2. The Value of Insurance
Any complete assessment of insurance underwriting’s contribution to
reducing the risk of foodborne illness requires not merely an appreciation of its
capacity to boost compliance but also an evaluation of the efficacy and efficiency of
the standards it seeks to enforce. This Article does not provide such an evaluation.
To be fair, this knowledge gap is not unique to insurance. It bedevils analyses of food
safety efforts through government regulation and industry supply chain management.
Although there is data to suggest that agency guidance from the FDA and the USDA
and industry programs like the LGMA have increased investments in food safety on
farms and improved compliance rates, there is no data to demonstrate whether those
efforts have reduced the incidence of foodborne illness.301 Nor is this uncertainty

297. Telephone Interview with Underwriter G, supra note 179.
298. See Boys, Food Product, supra note 138, at 3.
299. Agricultural trade associations are frequently closely associated with insurance providers. See,
e.g., FARMERS UNION INSURANCE, https://farmersunioninsurance.com/about[https://perma.cc/N2TAKRSE]. Some fresh produce distributors currently organize such risk pools among their suppliers.
Markley, supra note 134, at 15. One broker offers farmers market insurance using risk purchasing groups,
“where business with similar liability risks are able to purchase cost-effective and comprehensive
insurance coverage.” Coverage Details, supra note 279. The Farmers Market Coalition, a trade
association, partnered with a broker to similarly create a risk pool that makes farmers market insurance
affordable to small growers. FMC and Campbell Risk Management, supra note 177.
300. I am grateful to Professor Barry Goodwin for this suggestion.
301. For a comprehensive survey of data regarding investments in food safety and compliance rates in
the fresh produce sector, see LYTTON, supra note 3, at 162–77. For statements from leading experts
regarding the lack of data to evaluate the impact of food safety measures on foodborne illness rates, see
LYTTON, supra note 3, at 232–34.
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unique to food safety regulation. In most areas of regulatory policy, analysts lack
sufficient data to calculate the return on investment. As Peter Orszag, former
Director of the Office of Management and Budget in the Obama administration, and
John Bridgeland, former Director of the White House Domestic Policy Council in
the George W. Bush administration, explained in 2013: “Based on our rough
calculations, less than $1 out of every $100 of government spending is backed by
even the most basic evidence that the money is being spent wisely. . . . [L]ess than
$1 out of every $1,000 that the government spends on health care this year will go
toward evaluating whether the other $999-plus actually works.”302
Although it is not possible to offer a complete assessment, this Article
presents evidence that insurance adds significant value to food safety regulation.
Insofar as it is desirable to implement government policies and industry standards,
insurance incentives and oversight complement the efforts of government agencies
and industry associations. Indeed, as the next section discusses, insurance has
comparative advantages over government and industry oversight.
Moreover, the contribution of insurance to regulatory compliance and
standards conformity is likely to enhance policy evaluation in the future.
Policymaking at its best is an iterative process that typically begins with educated
guesses based on incomplete information and advances through feedback and
learning.303 Effective implementation and reliable oversight are essential to feedback
and learning. Insurance incentivizes farmers to implement current food safety
standards in their operations and gives underwriters reason to collect reliable
information about compliance.
B. Comparative Institutional Advantages of Insurance
One important way to assess the value of a regulatory approach is by
comparing it to alternatives.304 As a compliance mechanism, insurance has an
important advantage over government regulation. Insurance is less hampered by
resource constraints than publicly funded oversight. As the FDA’s inspection
responsibilities expand under FSMA, the agency must contend with limited
resources. Its state agency partners face similar budgetary constraints.305 By contrast,
as the market for food product liability and contamination coverage grows, insurance
companies will collect more premiums from which to fund inspections. For insurers,
increasing demand for inspections provides new revenue to pay for them.
Consequently, the capacity of insurance companies to oversee food safety on farms
far exceeds that of government agencies.

302. John Bridgeland & Peter Orszag, Can Government Play Moneyball?, THE ATLANTIC (July/Aug.
2013); see also, PETER SCHUCK, WHY GOVERNMENT FAILS SO OFTEN AND HOW IT CAN DO BETTER 20–
24 (2014).
303. For elaboration of the idea of policymaking as an iterative process, see FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF
THE U. N., DEVELOPING EFFECTIVE FOREST POL’Y—A GUIDE 15–16 (2010).
304. On comparative institutional analysis, see ROSS CHEIT, SETTING SAFETY STANDARDS:
REGULATION IN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS 17, 193 (1990); NEIL KOMESAR, IMPERFECT
ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 3–13 (1994); PETER
SCHUCK, THE LIMITS OF LAW: ESSAYS IN DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 424 (2000).
305. See supra notes 100–10 and accompanying text.
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Insurance also has an advantage over the most common form of privately
funded oversight in the fresh produce sector—private third-party food safety audits
paid for by growers.306 The conflict of interest that arises when growers pay for audits
compromises the integrity of those audits and undermines confidence in them.307
Although growers also pay for underwriting inspections, insurance companies have
a powerful incentive to ensure that these inspections are rigorous, because the insurer
is liable for at the costs of any food safety failure. The business model for insurance
company oversight of food safety on farms includes incentives for rigor and
reliability that are absent from private third-party food safety audits paid for by
growers. Moreover, the interviews suggest that underwriters are motivated not
merely to evaluate farmers but also to coach them on how to improve their food
safety practices. At their best, underwriting professionals are a private version of the
“good inspector” described by Eugene Bardach and Robert Kagan in their influential
study of regulatory reform, Going by the Book.308
I do not mean to suggest that insurance underwriting is a perfect solution.
It is, rather, one of several imperfect alternatives. Insurance comes with its own
limitations. For example, underwriting criteria vary considerably in their
sophistication—ranging from crude proxies for food safety such as farm size to stateof-the-art studies of contamination risk associated with different irrigation
methods.309 Insurance underwriters can also exercise their discretion in
discriminatory ways that evade detection by regulators.310
Nor do I mean to imply that the choice between government regulation,
industry supply chain management, and insurance underwriting are exclusive
alternatives. To the contrary, they are highly interdependent. For example, insurance
depends heavily on government outbreak investigation to create the liability
exposure that generates demand for insurance.311 Insurance relies also on industry
expertise to formulate underwriting criteria.312 Insurance is merely one component
of a system of interdependent efforts to advance food safety governance through
feedback and learning.313
C. Insurance Underwriting in Action
The interviews presented here expose an important shortcoming of relying
exclusively on economic theory to explain how insurance as risk regulation works.

306. For an explanation of why private third-party audits of fresh produce growers are typically paid
for by growers, see supra notes 115–27 and accompanying text.
307. For analysis of why buyers rely on audits paid for by growers and of the resulting conflict of
interest, see supra notes 116, 127 and accompanying text.
308. EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY
UNREASONABLENESS 123–51 (rev’d ed. 2002).
309. See supra Part IV.C.
310. Brian J. Glenn, The Shifting Rhetoric of Insurance Denial, 34 LAW & SOC. REV. 779 (2000)
(documenting a variety of discriminatory underwriting practices in assessing eligibility for insurance
coverage).
311. See supra Part IV.C.
312. See supra Part II.
313. For a more detailed analysis of food safety regulation as a complex adaptive system of
governance, see LYTTON, supra note 3, at 21–22, 152–61, 236–38.
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Economic theory explains the logic of insurance as regulation, but it does not suffice
to describe how underwriters help their clients manage risk. It is true that, as skeptics
have suggested, the infrequency of insurance claims compared to the prevalence of
foodborne illness prevents insurers from developing the actuarial data necessary to
calculate optimal food safety risk reduction.314 Underwriting professionals report
that they rely instead on anecdotal sources of information, including agency warning
letters and recall notices, conversations with university extension experts, and,
especially, newsfeeds. In interviews, the most frequently mentioned examples of
high-risk crops were leafy greens and cantaloupe.315 These two crops have become
notorious due to high-profile outbreaks, protracted litigation, and large insurance
settlements, all of which were extensively covered in the media.316 Agents,
underwriters, and loss control experts also reported basing their risk assessments on
personal intuitions about farmers’ competence and their impressions about the
observable hygiene and sanitation of farm operations.317 Thus, insurance as
regulation in the fresh produce sector relies on highly impressionistic underwriting
practices. It is far more art than actuarial science.
The absence of robust actuarial data and the general lack of evidence
concerning the effectiveness and efficiency of current food safety standards make
optimal deterrence a chimera. Consequently, insurance as regulation aims for the
more modest goals of regulatory compliance and standards conformity. Regulatory
compliance and standards conformity as underwriting criteria in farm and
agribusiness insurance are especially important because the dearth of claims means
that loss history may not be a reliable indicator of an operation’s food safety risk.318
Agents, underwriters, and loss control experts reported relying on regulatory
compliance and standards conformity as benchmarks for eligibility and taking them
into account when pricing premiums. They described warranty terms based on
private food safety audit scores, which in turn are a measure of regulatory
compliance and standards conformity. In public presentations, agents counseled
farmers to comply with regulations and conform to industry standards.319 Thus, the
professionals implementing insurance as regulation in the fresh produce sector think
in terms of improving compliance, not optimizing safety. Their mindset is more
administrative than economic.
The statements by underwriting professionals in this study reflect
considerable variation in the extent to which insurance companies attempt to manage
food safety risk and the sources of information on which they rely. Although typical
farm policies include liability coverage for food safety failures, the risk of such a
claim is extremely remote and the premiums are modest—which means that
underwriters have neither the incentive nor the resources to invest in food safety risk
management.320 By contrast, large brand-conscious agribusiness clients are more
worried about admittedly unlikely but potentially catastrophic losses from food
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

See Cogan, supra note 34, at 1542–45.
See supra notes 212, 221–26, 231, 251, 253 and accompanying text.
See LYTTON, supra note 3, chs. 1, 5–7.
See supra notes 243–48 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 237–40 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Farmers Market Coalition, supra note 290.
See supra notes 140–46 and accompanying text.
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safety failures, which leads them to purchase more expensive commercial liability
and product contamination policies. Underwriters for those policies are more
mindful of the potential for large claims as they review applications, price premiums,
and design contract terms, and they reserve a portion of the considerable premiums
to fund loss control activities.321
The demand for coverage capable of generating sufficient premiums to
spread such risk regulation efforts to more farms depends on liability exposure for
food safety failures, and that, in turn depends on the development of a more robust
outbreak investigation infrastructure. Linking more of the estimated 48 million
annual cases of acute foodborne illness in the U.S. to growers whose food safety
failures caused them is the key to taking full advantage of the capacity of insurance
to regulate food safety risk. Moreover, greater liability exposure would come with
an increase in claims, which would generate the type of claims data and enable the
kind of actuarial analysis that is common in other forms of insurance for similarly
widespread health and safety risks, such as auto and fire.322 Should the market for
food safety coverage mature in this way, underwriting might look more like what
economic theory imagines.
The interviews in this Article supplement economic theories of insurance
as risk regulation. A sociolegal approach that examines underwriting practices in
action reveals that, despite the absence of claims data and the inability to conduct
actuarial analysis, insurance underwriters help farmers manage the risk of foodborne
illness caused by microbial contamination of fresh produce.323 Getting into the weeds
of insuring those who work in America’s fresh produce growing fields helps to bring
abstract theories about insurance as means of risk regulation down to earth.
CONCLUSION
This Article illuminates the role that insurance plays in food safety
governance. It documents efforts by insurance companies to reduce the risk of
microbial contamination on farms that grow fresh produce. Interviews with
underwriting professionals reveal how they incentivize farmers to comply with
government regulations and conform to industry standards through risk selection,
premium pricing, coverage terms, loss control advice, and public education.
Although the extent of these efforts varies considerably, they reveal the
transformative potential of insurance to dramatically extend reliable oversight of
food safety practices on farms and, by extension, to other sectors of the food industry.
Additional research might explore how organizing risk pools and
government subsidies might support the proliferation of insurers’ risk management
efforts. What lessons are there to be gleaned from other examples of risk pooling, for
example, among small municipalities in liability insurance markets?324 Does federal

321. See supra Part IV.C.
322. For a comparison of injury, hospitalization, and death rates for foodborne illness, auto accidents,
and fire injuries, see LYTTON supra note 3, at 4–7.
323. See Macaulay & Friedman, supra note 40.
324. See Rappaport, supra note 25, at 1555 (analyzing the role of municipal liability insurance pools
in reducing police misconduct); see also Coverage Details, supra note 279 (citing examples of risk
purchasing groups for farmers insurance and farmers market insurance).
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crop insurance provide a relevant model for government subsidization of food safety
coverage?325
Food safety regulation in the fresh produce sector is characterized by a high
degree of uncertainty. Economic models of insurance as a means of risk regulation
assume that insurance tames uncertainty by using claims data and actuarial analysis
to price determinable risks and undertake cost-effective efforts to reduce them.326
Sociolegal investigation reveals that underwriting professionals are actively engaged
in efforts to reduce food safety risks despite a dearth of claims data and lack of
actuarial analysis necessary to tame uncertainty. This study suggests that
understanding the capacity of insurance to regulate food safety risk in the fresh
produce sector, as well as other types of risk more generally, can benefit from careful
fieldwork.

325. See ANONYMOUS, R45193, FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE: PROGRAM OVERVIEW FOR THE 115TH
CONGRESS
13
(2018),
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20180510_R45193_c94c4792ac1cba12047bb4080d2e8633ea3acf
a8.pdf [https://perma.cc/G27Y-BS2Y].
326. See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 14; Cogan, supra note 34; see also Baker, Uncertainty,
supra note 43 (describing and critiquing these economic models of insurance).

